The Ideological Worldviews of Al-Qaeda and the Neoconservatives: A Theoretical Perspective

The concept of ideology is a 'false consciousness or misled Weltanschauung[1] (world view[2]), and one which posits objective conditions and “realities” in order to manipulate certain social and political situations' (Behr and Heath 2009). This ‘false consciousness’ could either be the neoconservative view of US exceptionalism or Al-Qaeda’s vision of establishing an Islamic caliphate. To highlight the transient nature of ideology means seeing it not only as the product of disillusioned world view but also the process by which that happens.  For influential classical sociologists like Karl Mannheim, ‘a process of epistemological enquiry and identity interpretation leads to the eventual formation of more than just individual views of the world, but to the world view of an entire social group (totalizing world view)’ (ibid., 329 ). This highlights two things. Firstly the individual ideology of neoconservatives such as Irving Kristol leads to world views of an entire social group like the neoconservative led Committee on the Present Danger and Project for a New American Century. Individual interpretations of Political Islam range from the writings of Qutb and Hassan al-Banna[3] to contemporary faces of the ‘idea’ called Al-Qaeda like al-Zawahiri and bin-Laden. Their individual worldviews similarly follow a process towards forming a totalizing world view. Secondly, it highlights that it can be misleading to limit the understanding of ideology to the objectives and aims of individuals or social groups. The methods of achieving these form part of the construct of that ideology. This transforms certain perceived similarities between these groups into distinguishing features. The relentless pursuit of democracy, a government for and by the people, by the neoconservatives and Al-Qaeda’s appeal with the ‘people’ against Autocratic regimes may be interpreted as a similarity between them. This is important because it suggests, for instance in Al-Qaeda’s evolution, that the transformation of the strategic approach from stirring people popular uprising to terrorism and violence is a demonstration of transient ideological worldview. Targets changed from the ‘nearby enemy’ to a ‘faraway enemy’ (Keppel 2004), from non-Muslims to include Muslim regimes seen as puppets of the West and legitimizing terrorist attacks to include civilians that support them. What is originally construed as a shared characteristic now becomes opposing views of the benefits of democracy. For Al-Qaeda a clear dividing line exists between an Islamic State based on Sharia Law and a Muslim State based on secular law and rule.

The ideological worldviews of Al-Qaeda and Neoconservatives both have origins of being birthed as twins out of the liberal dream to build a better world (Curtis 2004). In the aftermath of the cold war, both Qutb and Strauss[4], shared a common philosophy. This was a neorealist perspective that materialism, individualism and Western liberalism led to nihilism. Both shared a determination to stop this destructive liberal force, and believed religion played a role in the solution. Both groups have historically demonstrated religious overtones in rhetoric by claiming a divine purpose and assignment. Irving Kristol, the founding father of the neoconservatives, believed strongly that only religion and not secularism could change America positively.  The Neoconservatives were proponents of religion and moral values playing a major role in US politics and foreign policy. Qutb’s Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, from which the ideology of Al-Qaeda is often traced, also believed a more political Islam had a central role to play. Al-Qaeda is however unlike majority of political Islamist movements that attempt to transform peacefully their societies and polities within national boundaries (Ayoob 2008). The role of religion in political conflicts is instrumental in the creation of the Islamic umma and the caliphate, the political order of the Islamicate. Islamic fundamentalism is an “ideology which stands in the context of the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics and is related to the politicization of Islamic cultural concepts and symbols.” (Tibi 2001 in Hellmich 2005, 41). The ideological worldview of protecting the umma is not unique to Al-Qaeda (Hellmich 2005). It’s been the subject of numerous essays such as those of Qutb and Mohammed al-Ghazzali[5].

According to prominent neoconservatives[6] the time had come to restore confidence in American exceptionalism and unique destiny in global leadership i.e. the ‘myth of the nation’ (Curtis 2004). Though tempting to view neoconservatives simply as realists, more insight is gained when their contrasting views to realism are highlighted by looking at the idea of the national interest and how that influenced foreign policy during the cold war Reagan years (Kristol 2003). Kristol doesn’t see the ‘national interest’ as a geographical term when the reference nation is a great power like the US. Accordingly ‘A larger nation has more extensive interests. And large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological[7] interests in addition to more material[8] concerns’ (ibid.). Kristol’s famous quip of fellow neoconservatives as ‘liberals who had been mugged by reality’ seems apt. This resonated with Qutb’s call for an elite revolutionary vanguard to resist jahilliyah[9] (Qutb 1990). An inspirational call for al-Zawahiri, bin-Laden’s mentor, to use ‘any means necessary’ to preserve the spread of liberal decadence represents the ideological roots of Al-Qaeda. Like neoconservatives, their ‘realist’ credentials are challenged as they embrace a ‘new militancy concerned neither with national states nor with international ideologies’ (Devji 2008, 5). Ideology here, less focused on the nation state, recasts the geography of Islam by replacing political references with historical ones (ibid.).

Citing the neorealist critique of liberalist values as a shared ideological worldview of the neoconservatives and Al-Qaeda is less convincing however when viewed in the context of Marxism. Neoconservatives share ideological worldviews with classic liberalisms support of capitalism as long as it’s not a derivative of nihilism. Marxist theory focuses on the essence of capitalism and economic competition. ‘Neo-conservatism’s approach to foreign policy must be understood against its broader philosophical background and in particular in the context of its engagement with the nature of politics in modernity’ (Williams 2005, 307). The neoconservative worldview on appropriate foreign policy in a need to restore faith in capitalism is evident in the economic motivations that led to the decision to go to war in Iraq. Imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism (Lenin 1996) can be linked to the ideology of the neoconservatives. In some ways this reflects the ‘venture capitalist terrorist enterprise’ model of Al-Qaeda where the leadership supports and funds independent terror organization ‘projects’ (Burke 2003). Even though others have likened Al-Qaeda’s structure to a multinational corporations reporting infrastructure (Smith 2002), in contrast to US neo-imperialist capitalism their abhorrence of the western capitalist society is clear. One area of stringent objection of Al-Qaeda to western capitalism is the strand of Neo-Marxism or World Systems Theory[10] described in the context of Iraq as US strategy to gain control of oil in the region. As a result the trend of US hegemony over other world powers with an energy dependence on oil can be sustained (Stokes 2007, Harvey 2003). It remains one major reason Al-Qaeda names the US as the enemy.

The constructivist school of thought emphasizes similarities between the neoconservatives and Al-Qaeda similarly. Constructivism is essentially concerned with the causal conceptions of how the social and political world works and recognizes ideas and ideology not just materiality. The dynamic nature of social constructs parallels the transient nature of the process and methodology of ideology. During the cold war, the neoconservatives exaggerated the Soviet threat and did the same with Al-Qaeda after 9/11. For constructivism, terrorism is a social construction. For Al-Qaeda, some scholars have highlighted its ‘metaphorical construction’ (Hülsse and Spencer 2008, 571). They mention terrorism as first constituted as war, but from 2004 onwards the principal metaphor shifting from war to crime, constructing Al-Qaeda as a criminal rather than a military organization. This shift has transformed Al-Qaeda from an external to a distorted internal threat. The turning point was Al-Qaeda gradually aligning their ideological worldview accordingly to this construct transforming them powerfully even when the reality was starkly different. Some authors have overlooked the exaggerated construction of Al-Qaeda being a highly organized and hierarchical network and gone to great lengths in assessing the dangers of illicit ‘networks’ (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008). Ironically, by citing the weaknesses of networks, they arrive at the same conclusion that the ‘organization’ may not be as threatening as many think. On the other side of the fence lies a construction of Islam threatened by an aggressive west and some scholars detail the powerful imagery and symbolism used to great effect in their analysis of Al-Qaeda propaganda video and the speeches of bin-Laden (Hellmich 2005). Thus viewing through the constructivist lens the language, accentuates some similarities. The arguably similar exaggerated construction of the ‘why they hate us’ language, with underlying religious rhetoric is used by Al-Qaeda and neoconservatives alike. Whilst some may identify religion as no less than a clash of civilizations (Lewis 1990), others conclude that ‘it is not a product of deprivation, individual rage, or religiously grounded predisposition; it is a result of social forces and, much of the time self-conscious conspiracies to fuel hatred’ (Sunstein 2002, 440). This social constructivist perspective emphasizes the ideological similarities.  

[1] The German term denotes a comprehensive set of opinions about the world as the medium and exercise of human existence.

[2] Worldview can be expressed as the fundamental cognitive, affective, and evaluative presuppositions a group of people make about the nature of things, and which they use to order their lives.

[3] Classical Political Islamist and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood

[4] Recognized as the source of ideological worldviews of Al-Qaeda and the neoconservatives respectively

[5] Influential Egyptian Islamic cleric who sought to interpret the Quran in a modern light

[6] Irving Kristol, William Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Kagan and Francis Fukuyama to name a few.

[7] Alternatively ‘Liberal’

[8] Alternatively ‘Marxist’

[9] ‘The state of ignorance of the guidance from God’ - The modern use of this term is the state of an individual not following Islam associated with Qutbs ideas of false consciousness causing an inability to rise up to overthrow the secular state and replace it with Sharia law.

[10] Geopolitically oriented theory challenging the Marxist view that capitalism promotes development everywhere arguing that societies in semi-periphery gain power but others don’t.

How crucial is soft power to the successful conduct of diplomacy?

There have been a plethora of debates on both sides of the liberal and realist fence of the effectiveness of soft power in facilitating diplomacy in general. The former stand as proponents saying that in this age of globalization with instant communication it is important that states do not rely alone on military or economic hard power. The realists on the other hand dismiss results. It will be argued here that soft power is crucial to the conduct of diplomacy but only effective when backed up by hard power as a tool to implement it. It will further be discussed how contradiction in foreign and domestic policy with the values a states soft power proposes to represent limits its value and clearly showing that this argument is only fluid and depends on the context i.e. the power relationship changes based on interests and desires of both parties in that relationship.


Power generally has been defined as the ability of one party to get another to do something they would not normally do in order to meet a set of objectives and/or interests of the first party. Hard power usually involves not only the use and threat of force i.e. some element of force but can also be the ‘carrot’ in a carrots and stick approach to diplomacy. The use of military force and economic incentives (or sanctions) are examples of how hard power is used.

One key element of soft power often overlooked is the ability to ‘attract’. It is not solely the use of peaceful negotiation or public information schemes to ‘sell’ what in effect are the three dimensions of soft power i.e. culture, values and foreign policy.

However proponents of soft power often overstate how crucial it is from a point of view of ‘attractiveness’ by ignoring to recognize that hard power resources like military might, economic dominance have an element of attraction. The US as the strongest military and even China as a rising economic giant are attractive. In the latter case the economic hard power has made it easier to accept soft power messages. A common resource or tool of propagating soft power used in Public Diplomacy Campaigns is cultural exchange programmes for example learning languages. The rise in the number of students globally interested in learning mandarin, studying Chinese art, music architecture or studying in Chinese universities can be attributed in no small part to the knowledge that China is an economic (hard) power. Implementing an event such as the recent Beijing Olympics, by all accounts a very successful conduct of diplomacy in the use of soft power required enormous economic strength.

One of the aims of diplomacy and can be judged to be successful where there is a changed perception positively of the country.

American popular culture that has been integrated into many other countries is a strong indication of the power of media in Public diplomacy. In the Middle Easy, especially since 9/11, there has been a growing need to use soft power to change perceptions of US in the Muslim world. Hollywood is recognized as the key driver and US made films and music is especially penetrating the youth in the Muslim world. In addition to this a review of Public Diplomacy strategies highlighted the internet as a major tool of leveraging soft power.

There are however some instances where soft power becomes less crucial and can thus be counterproductive.

One such example is where actual foreign policy and the actions associated with that are contradictory. Any flexing of soft power resources are then seen as hypocritical. An example could be the fact that even though the US portrays itself as the ‘defender’ of democracy and proposes to spread democracy to the world, its virtually unilateral action in the war on Iraq amidst less support has not helped its public image abroad. There is no evidence to suggest embracing soft power resources such as culture, values etc is an indication of acceptance of policy which means soft power is only crucial and effective when this is in place. It is common knowledge that militants in Somali loved American rap music and wore Levis Jeans whilst Kim Jong-Il of North Korea is reputed to love Pizza and music.

Another example of soft power limitations is the fact it produces a ‘bounce’ effect or reaction generating competition to the proponent of soft power. Japan’s technological advancement an attraction to many in South Asia resulted in becoming so attractive that this was copied and nations like Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and now China are in competition hence posing a challenge.

One difficulty in attempting to decide conclusively that soft power is crucial is in the vague way it is measured by many. As defined soft power is the ability to get someone to do what they would not otherwise do by attraction. As such this can only be measured where we have established firstly the context that the other party wouldn’t have done it anyway. If I ask or persuade my daughter to jump, I can only claim to my soft power being crucial with the assurance that she doesn’t love jumping. The context of measuring goes also into determining if there are already shared values or cultures which serve in themselves to facilitate. The power relationship is therefore always changing and how crucial soft power is in diplomatic negotiation is also fluid.

One recent phenomenon that underlines soft power essence especially in the last two decades is the proliferation of non-state actors including NGO’s and their growing importance in diplomacy in general. As a result of this there are a growing number of new issues that face nations and their foreign services such as Climate Change, Human rights, HIV and their securitization which has minimum to do with hard power alone. States consistently have to weld soft power for legitimacy in these issues closely adopting what is in essence important stages of implementation i.e.

In conclusion therefore, soft power in isolation does not seem to dominate in its importance in diplomacy. The contemporary political landscape means it is growing in importance with need however for economic military power to implement it. The limitations remain though in it cannot be a replacement for good policy and contradiction can be counterproductive along with the fact that ‘bounce’ can create competition.

The degree to which soft power has played a role positively in any diplomatic negotiation remains dependent on the nature of the power relationship, shared values and culture amongst other things.

Is the value of multilateralism overstated in contemporary international politics?

If contemporary international politics represents the interaction between states on a global level over the last two decades i.e. in the post cold war period, then there is no denying that there has been a proliferation if International organizations and a consequence of this has been a lot more multilateral diplomacy associated with this. It will be argued that this trend away from bilateral negotiations towards multilateral hasn’t been solely as a result of the value of negotiations involving multiple parties and multiple issues but has been one of necessity due to a changing political landscape partly shaped by globalization of international politics and new items on the agenda. Multilateralism defined in the context of diplomatic negotiation is the coming together of 3 or more interested parties in order to discuss and find solutions to issues and/or interests that are common to or impact all three parties and may impact the wider political landscape. The fact of having 3 or more parties having all interests represented in negotiations is often cited, particularly by liberals as one of the reasons multilateral negotiations are extremely valuable. Liberals would also argue that if the parties with interests are excluded from any talks, apart from the fact that they feel isolated and left out … meaning they could scupper progress at a later date, the agenda and hence topics of discussion would not be representative. Paradoxically this could be interpreted as the same side of the coin of a realist critique that parties always pursue their national interests and that is always where the balance would flow too.

The argument of total involvement was the logic behind the six party talks in an attempt to get North Korea to acquiesce to abandon its attempts to acquire Nuclear weapons. This is despite what has been a clear desire expressed by the regime of Kim Jong-il to have bilateral talks with particularly the US but also China. The involvement of all the other parties i.e. Russia, Japan, South Korea has more than anything produced what is a complex structure that needs complex logistical planning and schedule. The complexity of interest represented make the process slower and also provides too many exit points during negotiations. Similar to global contemporary issues like Climate Change, the rise of terrorism, Human and Drug Trafficking Crime, Nuclear proliferation indirectly even if not directly impacts majority of states in the world today. Involving all parties in multilateral issues as we face today is not primarily driven by the value that might add, but more so to mitigate the backlash not doing it would cause. Liberals of course would cite this as a benefit.

The proliferation of various non-state actors like NGO’s in the last two decades of the contemporary world for example in an area such as climate change explains the recent difficulties faced by parties at the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change. One of the main issues on the agenda was that of financing particularly how the richer countries who were blamed for causing carbon emissions would provide funding etc to the developing world, primarily Africa, Latin America and Asia who are perceived to be most impacted by this.This sticking point of financial support proved to be the lowest ebb of the negotiations and the ‘G77’ nations even threatened both boycott and walk out at various points of the negotiations. It is arguable that concurrently held bilateral and trilateral negotiations would have been able to take advantage of ‘windows of opportunity’ to achieve quick wins which are essential to continue to build diplomatic momentum.

Referring back to the case of DPRK and the NPT, economic sanctions are viewed as ineffective if not applied multilaterally by all to have the maximum coercive influence. What liberals and institutionalists might however fail to highlight is the power imbalance that realists look at both economically and militarily. Economically the reality is that China proves the primary nation that can influence the DPRK in terms of sanctions. DPRK depends on China for its food and energy needs and unilateral sanctions would remain most effective when applied by China. This was evident when China cut off gas supplies to North Korea for 3 days in a thinly veiled threat using the excuse of ‘technical problems’.

The reasons it’s valuable to involve countries like Japan and Russia, though lies in interests is also because of ensuring legitimacy of any outcome of negotiations. The proliferation of NGO’s has also shown a growing norm of the power of Global Civil Society in influencing agenda outcomes and multilateral institutions have no choice but to include them in negotiation. Jessica Matthews writing and illustrating the ‘Power Shift’ in International Contemporary politics demonstrates how NGO’s of all kinds have moved from negotiating in the corridors to having a place at the negotiating table. Globalization has played a dominant role in the need to act multilaterally in diplomacy. The democratization of finance, information and technology means that states can no longer ignore actors and they have to do it very quickly.

The CNN effect means that even when traditional bilateral diplomacy, with its quick wins, easier structure, focus on interests has already produced a desired effect, this still has to placed in a multilateral framework, not because of added value but because Global Civil Society demands it.

In conclusion therefore, multilateralism does have added value in bringing legitimacy, ensuring all interests are considered and being in line with the norm of Global solutions for Global problems. This value is overstated because it serves more to deal as a response to globalization and proliferation of new issues and acts – resolving its problems. Bilateral negotiations on the other hand tend to be future focused and by ensuring transparency and adequate reporting to other parties that may have limited interests in the issues being discussed, mitigate potential multilateral pitfalls like isolation, exit options and legitimacy needs.

Al-Qaeda, Neoconservatives and Ideology: A Summary

There is extensive analysis about what Al-Qaeda really is and an equally broad spectrum of opinions about who the neoconservatives are. Al-Qaeda has been described as a ‘transnational terror organization’ (Smith 2002, 2), ‘religious extremist insurgents’ (Petraeus and Amos 2006, 1-15), an ‘organization of elite vanguards’ (Riedel 2007, 108) a ‘global jihad movement’ (Coll & Glasser 2005 in Cronin 2006, 33) comprising fundamentalist Islamic membership and a hierarchical network of terror with ‘multi-cellular structure’ (Smith 2002, 3). It’s even been described as a venture capitalist enterprise sponsoring terrorist activities or ‘Holy War Foundation’ (Burke 2003, 208). It is beyond the scope to unravel the structure of Al-Qaeda or histories of its prominent symbolic figures such as Osama bin-Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri. It’s more relevant to understand what the idea represents. Some insist that even considering Al-Qaeda as an organization is misleading (Cronin 2006, Burke 2003). It’s more aptly described as a ‘nebula of independent entities and individuals that share an ideological worldviews and cooperate’ (Raufer 2003 in Cronin 2006, 33). It’s pertinent to recollect that Al-Qaeda is linked with the original umbrella group formed in 1998 called the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. Under this umbrella were various groups from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia and various others with loose connections. Though it’s misleading to attribute their shared ideology as a unique defining characteristic of Al-Qaeda in particular, a core shared belief of Transnational Jihadist Groups, Al-Qaeda included, is that the umma are a single indivisible nation and that it is against Gods law to separate them ensuring all Islamic land is returned to Muslims to create a single caliphate (Rahnema 2008). It is this idea and the changing methods used to achieve this objective that represents Al-Qaeda.

In a similar vein the neoconservative moment represents a grand idea to resolve the problem of liberal decadence by re-establishing virtues and morals based on the founding principles of the US constitution. This is evident in the principles of the neoconservative think tank ‘Project for the New American Century’. It outlines the ‘need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles’ (Abrams, et al. 1997). In marked contrast to the vagueness of the membership of Al-Qaeda, i.e. lacking an organized identifiable hierarchy with clear aims and objectives, the neoconservatives represent a select identifiable group of elite academics and politicians. With roots in the lobby group called the ‘Committee on the Present Danger’, coming to prominence around 1997, they championed a mix of liberal values like spreading democracy and realist ideas of promoting US hegemony. Neoconservative thinking essentially comprises four strands: (1) Isolationalism and acting unilaterally; (2) Military power as a prominent feature of foreign policy; (3) Liberal institutionalism by exemplarism in the force of US example demonstrated by the selective use of institutions and multilateral frameworks; and (4) Primacist vindicationist view of spreading ‘universal’ political values of democracy (Ikenberry 2004) markedly different from Al-Qaeda’s view of democracy. According to James Robbins, Al-Qaeda is waging a war on liberalism which is a political manifestation of the mindset exemplified by the likes of al-Zawahiri suggesting ‘law was created to rule man, not vice versa’ (Robbins 2005).

In academic discourse, when assessing ideology with groups such as Al-Qaeda and the neoconservatives, one seemingly obvious but often made omission is contextualising appropriately the blur between strategy and tactics. It initially appears that predominantly the former i.e. strategic objective is more closely associated with ideology. However for a holistic analysis, this essay doesn’t proffer that either objectives and aims or methods and tactics used to achieve the said objectives are on their own indicative of ideology. For instance for Al-Qaeda, its approach to recruitment, sources of funding and mode of communication aren’t necessarily indicative of a particular ideology. However, it plays a role as part of the process of ideology formation. Likewise whilst the motivations and strategic foreign policy goals of the neoconservatives are a pointer to underlying ideology, it would be misleading for instance to suggest military tactics on its own for either war in Iraq or Afghanistan reveals ideology. Motivations are indicative but the concept of ideology as a process embodies both objectives and methods used.

For a full version of this essay please email Saheed Adegbite at adegbites@gmail.com