Under what conditions does war assist with state and nation building?

Introduction


Good wars make strong states stronger and bad wars make weak states weaker. This essay highlights that a preferable backdrop for starting to outline the conditions under which war favours state and nation building is an extension of Tilly’s thesis that firstly is less generic and secondly more conditional on the type of state or nation and war. ‘Good’ wars here refer to the implied Clausewitzian view of total war requiring “utmost use of force” to “disarm the enemy” by “utmost exertion of power” (Clausewitz, 1997, pp. 6-8). The use of the term ‘Bad’ wars here concurs Stathis Kalyvas when he critiques versions that distinguish new civil wars as criminal, depoliticized, private and predatory and old civil wars as ideological, political and collective (Kalyvas, 2001). The distinction is in the impact meaning good builds and bad disintegrates. War here is identified as a catalyst to state formation and not causal. Samuel Huntingdon notes that “war was the great stimulus to state building” (Huntingdon, 1968, p. 123). Miguel Centeno agrees when he says “... wars help build the institutional basis of modern states by requiring a degree of modern organisation and efficiency that any new structures could provide; they are a great stimulus for state building” (Centeno, 2002, p. 102). He also notes that “there is a causal ambiguity in Tilly’s famous aphorism: which came first, state or wars?” (Centeno, 2002, p. 106). In this account, the state system, strong or weak, in which war takes place, to build or weaken, already exists.

This essay encompasses three main parts. Firstly, the comprehension of war, states and nations is significant in determining the extent and conditions under which war aids state and nation building. It provides a context for this argument by defining the terms whilst unravelling the interdependent relationship between a state and nation assessing if they are two sides of the same coin. This framework is completed by highlighting the relevance of various authors’ comparative analysis of the impact of wars in European and Third World state formation (Herbst, 1990; Ayoob, 1991; Centeno, 2003; Desch, 1996). Secondly, the statement ‘Good war makes strong states stronger and bad war makes weak states weaker’ is assessed to determine if war acts only as a catalyst to state formation or is more pivotal. Mentioning briefly a wide range of empirical instances highlights some contradictions that imply it is flawed to draw generic conclusions on what explicitly makes war assist in state building. Thirdly, the essay draws on and explains a broad spectrum of arguments for war assisting state formation. It discusses the complex relationship between power, economy, war and state formation by looking at monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and the changing economic system in the contemporary world. How the changing international context and political norms under which war operate affect state building is important. Historical events such as decolonisation and the cold war and trends such as the proliferation of ‘new’ wars and nationalism and their effect on state building is discussed. For each of these, to accentuate the complexity, empirical examples on both sides of the state building and weakening fence are revealed. The relationship means state formation and disintegration occur in parallel and this becomes evident by assessing the causal nature of war in each scenario.



State and Nation building: Two sides of the same coin?

The state is pivotal to the study of international relations and likely to be so for some time. States are a common unit of analysis in theories of international relations being fundamental to realism (Waltz, 1979) and neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1984) and many constructivist and English School theories (Bull, 1977; Rues-Smit, 1999; Wendt, 1999). States decide to go to war. Invariably extensive research exists about the conditions under which war assists state building. Some contend that contemporary states especially in the third world are replicating European State making through warfare though this is being hindered by colonial legacies by dependent development, humanitarian intervention and arbitrary boundaries (Ayoob, 1991). Others consider the ‘Un-Making’ of States results from contemporary state building taking place in a globalised context with decentralization of coercion and capital leading to dismantled administrations and politics becoming more civilian (Leander, 2004). A vast majority of these have taken the approach of a critique of Charles Tilly’s historical work outlining the link between patterns of state formation in Europe and war. As a result ‘War made the State, and the State made War’ (Tilly, 1985) remains undoubtedly the most famous dictum used as a starting basis for such analyses.

An important consideration is the conditions under which war impacts both states and nations. It’s important to juxtapose a definition of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 1919) with reference to nations as “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991). Whilst States are tangible physical manifestations evident in the existence of a government and their institutions, borders, finance, economy and military, a nation has intangible characteristics and is identified by entities such as culture, race, identity, communities, a sense of belonging and allegiance. Despite nations needing states and vice versa, assuming the existence of one means the existence of the other is too simplistic. Nations need states as a protective apparatus to defend nation's existence as a distinct political community and states need nations as it is easier to rule from consent rather than coercion also helping to legitimize the state control. The conditions under which war helps nation building are not by default those that also accelerate state building. Nationalism is a catalyst to state building for majority of cases and so the scope here addresses conditions for which war has a similar impact on nations and states despite exceptions, like Palestine, where one exists without the other - nation without a state.

“State formation refers to the building of institutions for territorial control, and the process by which one constellation of societal interests achieve state power and international recognition rather than another” (Wendt & Barnett, 1993, p. 322). The modern state is regulative and intrusive by restricting the freedoms of its citizens. It is extractive using various instruments to get resources from its people such as taxation and coercive, enacting legislation to punish citizens that don’t comply with its wishes taking advantage of its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. These characteristics often apply to both strong and weak states but when some scholars debate the difference between European and third world state creation in an attempt to critique Tilly's aphorism they fail to clarify this difference.



How relevant is European and Third World Comparative Analysis?

The essence of Tilly’s analysis is encapsulated in three factors that he felt contributed to state formation in Europe namely the monopoly on violence within the state, a system of bureaucracy mainly through taxation and building a sense of nation. In short, coercion works and connects war and state formation in the four stage process: war, followed by extraction, then repression and finally state formation. The security required for effective taxation in led eventually to state control of the means to violence throughout its territory (Tilly, 1990). Despite Tilly’s work being comprehensive, the shortcoming of using it as the basis of any critical analysis is its broad generalization and failure to properly put war and the state in its proper context recognizing the complex myriad and dependency on the nature of war and type of state or nation being addressed.

Some authors have attempted to address this shortcoming by a critique of the Eurocentric nature of Tilly’s work, preferring to contrast the developing world with European state making and contrasting with state formation in the third world (Sorenson, 2001; Herbst, 1990; Taylor & Botea, 2008) highlighting empirical examples that connect weak states in the developing world with the wrong type of war and the formation of stronger states to the right type of war presenting an existential threat. The relevance of such comparative analysis is the contradictions it exposes. Jeffrey Herbst makes the observation that the few interstate wars that have occurred in the third world are pushed to the forefront and obscure the fact that the vast majority of conflicts especially in Africa have not been “wars of conquest that threatened the existence of other states.” (Herbst, 1990, p. 123). He highlights that wars like India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, China-Vietnam and existential threats faced by Israel, South Korea or Taiwan often dominate analysis. By contrast Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda, the Western Sahara colonial question, Somalia’s attempt to invade Ethiopia, South African attempts to destabilize Lesotho and Swaziland, Libya’s war against Chad all lacked any real territorial ambitions. William Reno is also sceptical of bellicose viewpoint that suggests Africa might trace the same path as Europe (Reno, 1998). He illustrates his point with weak states such as Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone and it’s quite easy to see that these states, in warlord politics, lack a monopoly of the use of violence needed for state formation in the Tillian model. The point worth emphasizing here is that for every example given that supports Tilly’s thesis, there is an exception that doesn’t. Taylor and Botea highlight this very well when comparing Vietnam and Afghanistan, two nations with similar war experiences but very different result in the strength of the resulting state (Taylor & Botea, 2008). The impact of conditions recognized as influencing state building namely raising money, building armies and making nations are shown to have different outcomes. The only logical conclusion seems to be that war alone cannot be responsible and the combination with revolution and existence of a core ethnic group are put forward in this case.

In the debate surrounding state formation in Africa, some argue that all that is needed is more time - European state formation took time and Africa and the rest of the Third worked needs the same amount of time. It’s anybody’s guess how long is needed. Georg Sorenson notes that the core processes of European State formation took much less than 400 years and contrasts with the fact that state building in post colonial Taiwan and South Korea can take place in five decades (Sorenson, 2001). He further compares Kenya with Korea who both started at similar levels but are now miles apart in terms of development. Most Sub Saharan African nations have made little progress in the last 50 years. Why would more time make a difference? The Democratic Republic of Congo has had a wrong type of prolonged war for 10 years which has only made this weak state weaker and the same applies in Afghanistan which has been at war for three decades. Stein Eriksen notes that the wars in the D.R.C. differ from conventional wars, since they are not about territory: “The invaders do not seek to change existing borders or to question the territorial sovereignty of the states they invade” (Eriksen, 2005).



Is war causal or just a catalyst for state building?

Using Latin America, where there has been very little change in boundaries since 1840 compared to other continents, Miguel Centeno modifies Tilly by outlining pre-requisites for successful state building (Centeno, 2002). He suggests that an existing dominant elite making hard decisions which in the past even lead to genocide and population displacement and a ‘protostate’ providing a base to build upon were important. He emphasises the idea of a nation showing that states without nations, fragmented identities, appeared at the same time with a similar economic dynamic meaning no competing threat with neighbouring states unlike in Europe where some states were stronger than others. Because they were fiscally fragile and failed to monopolize internal violence, the states remained weak and in some cases weakened. These ‘limited wars’ in contrast to ‘total wars’ were essentially over small geographical areas by small mercenary armies or even where they were interstate occurring between nations of similar ideology. Strong nation states require an already emerging nation which war then strengthens. Many states in Latin America emerged from the collapse of the Spanish Empire rather than any form of grassroots dissent leaving a gap of national movements – in other words no ‘foundational’ state on which war could build on, strengthen and develop. Michael Desch refers to “State Deformation” theories which maintain that changed international security environment, in our case war (or indeed the lack of it), makes the continued broad scope or status quo of states doubtful (Desch, 1996). This argument balances on assuming war influences the expansion of state scope and the lack of the appropriate kind of war, its collapse. Desch points out that the distinction however between strong and weak states can be quite vague and ‘scope’ (minimal and maximal) and ‘cohesion’ (divided and unified) provide less vague categorizations. In this context his statement “Strong states are highly cohesive and tend to be maximal, weak states are divided and tend to be minimal” is in line with the argument put here of the catalyzing role of war making strong states stronger and weak states weaker.



Power, Economics, War and State Formation: What’s the link?

The state having the legitimate monopoly over violence and the economic factors inherent in war that aid state making are often addressed separately. The connection between them is missed though central to the argument that states are strengthened by war. To build a state, economic funds are essential and rulers require power monopoly to sustain this. Even though it is the moments in warfare which are useful for centralizing power, not war as a continuum, war still create incentives and the means to create and centralize power. The monopoly over power leads to monopoly over taxes, a key source of revenue for war. War as an existential threat to the state aids state building by giving the ruler reasons to consolidate and accumulate his power as citizens become willing to work harder, contribute more and even make the ultimate sacrifice – their lives. Cyclically, the ability to deal with external war threat can then be used to maintain control over the population including monopoly of taxes and finances giving funds necessary to raise and maintain an army consolidating ruler power. Notably there are different sources of revenue for war - rent, taxes on commercial transactions and land. Where the taxes are already too high and cannot meet the cost of war, states borrow from capitalists hoping the 'spoils of war' can be used as an additional source of revenue. In a chicken and egg analogy this recurring pattern of the ability to maintain control and accumulate revenue for war, conduct war and subsequently consolidate state power further. The flip side where inadequate power and economics leads to the wrong type of war makes weak states even weaker. Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett mention that “analyses inspired by dependency theory continue to offer a systematic framework for thinking about the impact of the world economy on Third World state formation” (Wendt & Barnett, 1993, p. 330). Even in the European context, the disintegration of Yugoslavia has been linked to the shock-therapy program of economic reform. According to Susan Woodward, these reforms “ask for political suicide: they require governments to reduce their own powers” (Woodward, 1995, p. 17). Caution should be applied in acquiescing with ‘conventional wisdom’ that war in Yugoslavia arose out of Balkan hatreds or Serbian aggression. Dejan Jovic also outlines the ‘economic argument’ as one of seven he identifies in recent literature as reasons for the collapse of Yugoslavia (Jovic, 2001, p. 101). In this account, the widening gap between the developed regions (such as Slovenia and Croatia) and under developed republics and provinces (such as Kosovo) encouraged independence seeking for developmental reasons. This has the propensity to develop into Civil War, further weakening already weak states.

Different ways of raising funds can lead to different legacies and extent to which the state economy is monetized making a difference on the impact of war in state building. In a state where there are lots of commercial transactions, a fiscal system is generally already in place to adapt to the needs of warfare and there is only a need for control of key locations e.g. border posts making it easier to raise funds. Historically the Netherlands represented a much monetized economy but Russia and Spain not very monetised and therefore needed to extract funds laboriously whilst monitoring its citizens. Good control over this power and economy relationship assists state building.



International ‘Context’ and Political Norms

The norm of sovereignty includes the acts of non-intervention and destruction meaning states cannot simply be extinguished. Within a sovereign territory, an ordered, universal and obligatory system of rule exists for the state allowing it to function under conditions that strengthen it such as monopoly over means of violence (Giddens, 1987). Third world states cannot and could not when they were created be extinguished and as such didn’t face the same threat of extinction to make them strong. Africa in the post 1914 era lacked the wars of conquest that Europe faced when their states were being created. The anti-colonial conflicts in Africa were too brief and insufficient to create an identity.

Some argue that modern developing states are essentially replicating the experiences of their early modern European counterparts, particularly with regard to the effects of external and internal competitors on extraction efforts. Some argue that developing states are engaged in exactly the same types of struggles their European predecessors went through to centralize power (Cohen, Brown, & Organski, 1981). They suggest that while many look upon the internal conflicts in the developing world as evidence of political decay, in fact, out of such conflict will arise a new political order through the centralization of power. They further suggest that "increasing central state claims for resources-for the material means of state-making and domination-intrude into and compete with pre-existing structures of rights and obligations which tie those resources to sub national collectivises and/or 'polities,' " (Cohen, Brown, & Organski, 1981, p. 902) resulting in conflict much the same as in early modern Europe. In keeping with predatory state theory, they argue that the main driving force behind the increased extractive activities in addition to state making was war making. Lustick concludes that "international norms and great power policies have been responsible for blocking the emergence of a great power in the Middle East by deterring or preventing state-building wars from being fought to successful conclusions across existing Middle Eastern boundaries" (Lustick, 1997)

Considering the power and subsequent economic factors against the backdrop of decolonization and its aftermath, the way revenue is extracted creates different types of empires since the economic institutions are left as a legacy to the state. In the developing world, colonized nations reflect the systems in the metropolis. War, having induced a change in the fiscal apparatus, then leads to permanence as the newly created state departments stay self interested enough to fight being dismantled post war. The sources of capital in the European context came from within the empire. Post colonial states existed on Independence Day and the legacies left behind (economic, political and administrative) remains a key determinant of their strengthening.

Georg Sorenson identifies colonization as developing some of the administrative structures that are conducive to state building for example creating central institutions with power and monopoly over the means of violence being in the capital with the elite, police and military and clear borders and boundaries (Sorenson, 2001). However, the artificial borders created as a result and subsequently the rapid process of decolonization lead to ethnic conflict which formed the basis of the 'wrong’ type of wars. It’s convenient to put forward decolonization or the ‘Fall of Empires’ argument strictly from an African or Asian context and ignore European examples. Jovic tries to dismiss the disintegration of Yugoslavia, another exception, by calling it an “ideological empire” (Jovic, 2001). What he fails to expand on though is some descriptions of Tito’s Yugoslavia as a multiethnic empire similar to the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. On decolonization and its economic impact, Wonik Kim looks at the origins of the developmental state in East Asia (Kim, 2009). Korea and Taiwan are often cited as economic miracles of Asia and states gaining their strength and bucking the trend of other developing nations coming out of the effects of colonization and war. Rightly, Wonik makes the key point that the impact of the reversal of colonial legacy is too often downplayed in favour of accentuating effective industrial policy. Attributing the wrong type of wars to already weak states in Africa as a catalyst for continued state failure may make sense on the one hand. However despite a general impact of colonial legacies on third world state, the link to war as causal is blurred. Decolonisation does have a link to the existence of an economic environment that isn’t conducive to state building which supports the argument that the effects cannot be attributed to war alone. When the source of the capital comes from outside it means there is a dependence on metropolitan states. In colonial times, the metropolis interest is primarily for its resources and thus the focus is one aspect of the colony and its economy, the rest is subsequently ignored and left to develop in its own way. This accentuates the growing of elite that doesn’t integrate with local workers. Following decolonisation bringing the elite into power, only one aspect of the ex-colony remains economically viable, leaving the state still very dependent on the metropolis which doesn’t aid state building. The growing norm of humanitarian intervention, or its economic equivalent - ‘shock therapy’, is the contemporary version of this phenomenon. This produces aid dependency and discourages state formation. The Chinese adage "Give a man a fish and he will eat for a day, teach a man to fish and he’ll eat for a lifetime" serves well as an analogy to explain state weakness and how weak states grow weaker. This analogy can be further stretched from dependency theory of Third world economic development to the link between dependent state formation and militarization. According to Wendt and Barnett "the hierarchical structure of the world system conditions the form of Third World military development via its impact on state formation” (Wendt & Barnett, 1993, p. 323). Intervention, humanitarian, economic or otherwise is a consequence of war and not a character of war, making it difficult to attribute its impact solely to war.

No other single ‘event’ of the twentieth century represents more clearly the state building capability of ‘war’ due to the existential threat it poses than the cold war. The further strengthening of strong states in this ‘good war’ to become global superpowers and the subsequent collapse post cold war of the former Soviet Union speaks volumes. During the “Great Game”, the superpowers exported their wars to the Third world which led to many ‘wrong type of war’ intra-state conflicts between divided ethnic groups (Ayoob, 1991; Thies, 2004). The breakup of the former Yugoslavia, an 'Independent' Communist State, is another case in point. During the cold war, it benefited from being able to reach to both eastern and western blocs. At end of cold war, this ends and the republic suffers economically and Structural Adjustment Programmes forced on it reduce the size of the state, making it even weaker. The central state was shrinking when ethnic rivalries started and maintaining order was a challenge. According to Susan Woodwards predominantly materialistic explanation, "the sense of community declines when governments narrow what they can provide" (Woodward, 1995). Racial hatred fuelled by the decline in economic provision. She further comments “Tensions along ethnic, racial, or historical fault lines can lead to civil violence” – the wrong type of war. It mustn’t be neglected to mention here that even in the case of Yugoslavia, state disintegration sits in parallel to state formation. The strength or lack of it of the newly created states like Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro is less the focus than their existence. Michael Desch suggests that after the cold war the "decline in the external threat environment may reduce the scope and cohesion of many states" (Desch, 1996, p. 237). According to him, since the end of the cold war, developing states for the most part have not experienced a threatening external environment, meaning their state structures are smaller, internally divided with political and economic instability. Those few developing states that have had threatening external environments, such as China, Cuba, Israel, and South Korea, have developed stronger states than their counterparts in the developing world. The lack of a threatening external environment that explains the lack of a great power also explains the lack of strong states generally in the region.

If wars are a catalyst rather than causal to state building, a pertinent question is if ‘new wars’ present a more existential threat to states and thus affect state building more. Are there really new wars or have they always existed and just more common now? The changing international context of warfare and new actors challenges the extent to which Weber's understanding of the state as having the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence continues to have relevance (Weber, 1919). Whatever conclusion that debate produces doesn’t dilute the perspective that state building begins with the effort to monopolize the means of violence within a delimited territory. New wars, “a new type of organized violence” (Kaldor, 1999, p. 1) are often described as internal, civil, private, informal and low intensity conflicts. It is not as pertinent to understand them in the context of globalization (Kaldor, 1999) or if they are a consequence of the end of cold war discussed earlier. What is clear is as the argument goes; in most cases they aid state disintegration further. Kaldor says “The new wars arise in the context of the autonomy of the state and in some extreme cases the disintegration of the state. In particular, they occur in the context of the erosion of the monopoly of legitimized violence (Kaldor, 1999, p. 4). Essentially “new wars are part of a process which is more or less a reversal of the process through which modern states evolved” (Kaldor, 1999, p. 5). To simply state that ‘War makes states’ knowing the changing nature of war initiates this reversal is naive. Bad war that makes weak states grow weaker tend to lack purpose and are more disintegrating than creating (Kalyvas, 2001). It’s even more succinctly put by Miguel Centeno for the Latin American context, “Limited wars and Limited states” (Centeno, 2003). Taylor and Botea also mention that in Afghanistan, which had the 'right type of war' against a common enemy during Soviet occupation, did not actually rally the country or encourage the building of administrative structures (Taylor & Botea, 2008). Attempts at raising money or building armies were unsuccessful. It did not even encourage any form of nationalism or banding together and divided the people against each other. Because Afghanistan was weak before the conflict even began, it just made it weaker.

War does provide the right environment for nationalism, aiding nation building and as a consequence state building. War on its own does not make a state and there are additional influencing factors. For example Yugoslavia seemed to lack a core ethnic group to provide banded nationalism for state building (Taylor & Botea, 2008). On the contrary the ‘nationalism’ that existed amongst the three groups Serbs, Bosnians and Croats proved to be more of a disintegrating factor. Mass conscription and army building could actually lead to arming people against the government as well as the enemy. The number of military coups in the developing world could be cited as evidence of how the process of building armies could lead to state collapse or at least restrict state building. Wars help to define citizenship. In Africa though, a lack of identification by population with their state due to arbitrary borders restricted state consolidation. Jovic doesn’t agree that nationalism is state building when you look at the disintegration of Yugoslavia resulting from Serb nationalism if we take the ‘nationalism argument’ (Jovic, 2001).



Conclusion

The importance of extending Tilly’s ‘War makes States’ aphorism by making it less generic and more conditional on the type of state is essential in determining what conditions under which war assists state building. To further build a robust perspective for such an analysis it’s important to bear a couple of things in mind. Firstly, even though in majority of cases war, under similar conditions, build or weaken nations and states, they do not always reflect two sides of the same coin. Secondly, comparative analysis of war making and state building in Europe and the third world is relevant also because of the contradictions it can expose. In the contemporary state system, war is more of a catalyst in strengthening the state than causal in creating it.

The monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and its complex link with the changing economic system in the contemporary world is not always facilitative towards ‘good’ war and state building but can be disintegrating as well. War remains one factor for state building questioning the extent of its causal characteristic, heightened because of how changing International context and political norms produce different results. Decolonisation, the cold war, new types of war, nationalism, time all have their own state building (or weakening) capabilities that presents a more complex myriad than Tilly suggests. The relationship between state formation and state disintegration occurring side by side further blurs the causal nature of war in each scenario. The impact of conditions recognized as influencing state building namely raising money, building armies and making nations are empirically shown to have different outcomes. That way war alone cannot be seen to be solely responsible but as a catalyst for state formation (or indeed state weakening) rather than causal.



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Tajikistan: Collapsing from within ... What next for Security Policy?

Tajikistan: Collapsing from within ... What next for Security Policy?




Recent Events

A number of fragile economic factors and internal political instability is threatening security in the region. An uncertain future for Tajik migrant workers in Russia, a looming energy security crisis and decline in Aluminium revenues is creating a difficult environment for the government of President Rakhmon further exacerbated by attacks near Afghanistan and Uzbekistan by the Taliban and Islamic Movement respectively.



Recommendations

In the event of collapse, enhance security in the region by supporting new administration whilst providing security guarantees for new and previous government officials.



Prior and after any collapse: It is essential to understand current internal political situation and transition scenarios and maintain key bilateral relationships by

 Taking advantage of Russia’s current chairmanship of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to increase influence in the region, pressing for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as an instrument so as to play a key role in any potential interventions in the event of any state collapse.

 Providing support to maintain security but publicly issue gentle warnings to President Rakhmon now, the new administration in the event of a collapse and the International community concerning any belligerence to resolving the internal instability caused by the energy shortage, failing economy, rising Islamic militancy as a consequence of the porous border.

 Enhance cooperation with the US in use of the Northern Distribution Network for supplying security in the region and facilitating President Obama’s recent surge of troops in Afghanistan as part of Operation Moshtarak.



What has brought this about?

President Rakhmon has for a while paid little attention to domestic crisis such as labour migration , energy shortages and protection for his people. Economically Tajikistan has been in the balance relying on aid and remittances from migrant labour and a growing dependence on this against a backdrop of the global economic crisis is unsustainable.



Rakhmon – Past, Present and Future

Since 1994 Russian backed Rakhmon, now in his third term as President, has been pro-Soviet. However, his historically firm grip on power and substantial public support is waning fast .

At the moment, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to cite the current crisis as the beginning of his demise. The OSCE reported the recent parliamentary elections in February were fraught with irregularities and that has added to challenges to his legitimacy and hold on power.



 

What pressure points for Russia?

• The level of social unrest is unprecedented. The energy situation is deteriorating and is much worse than the winter crises of 2008 and 2009. Economy is weak. This means increasing pressure on Russia to demonstrate multidimensional support for any new regime – politically, economically and militarily even if this policy stance becomes untenable.

• Afghanistan preoccupies President Rakhmon and rightly so. The porous border is one of the main routes for drugs on their way to Russia. Rakhmon has used this though as leverage with US and NATO following their growing concern regarding Pakistan’s inability to provide a reliable military supply route . Russia faces even more pressure from US and the West to continue to act as necessary to stem drug trade and activities of Taliban and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. If Rakhmons administration collapses, Moscow may be faced with the conundrum of extension of US/NATO bases from temporary to more permanent that are within striking distance of Afghanistan and a failed state such as Tajikistan – a haven for Islamist extremism.



What is the current Russian Security Policy in Central Asia and Tajikistan and is it effective?

Multilateral Institutions: Russia advocates CSTO to be as strong as NATO as a key instrument to maintain stability and security in region in order to prevent risks of destabilization and the CIS as an instrument of multilateral political dialogue.

Economically to strengthen the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) as common economic space in region and support the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The economic crisis has forced a recent cutback in migration labour quotas from 3.9 million reduced to 1.95 million.

Security: The 101st airborne division continued existence as part of 1999 Russo-Tajik Agreement to set up a Military base in Tajikistan with Russian forces still providing reinforcements to Tajiks guarding the external borders of Tajikistan. To actively promote the

European Security Treaty



In the current environment there is a limited success on this broad policy.

Russia’s military presence in Tajikistan has been very effective in tackling internal or regional security matters, but has not been used as a long term leverage to meet Russia’s long term political and economic interests. The Multilateral organizations (CIS, CSTO, EurAsEC, SCO) have helped Russia absorb shock of declining influence by providing their own checks and balances and continued advocacy and strengthening of this is advised.

The cutback in labour migration has had little effect because as much as 65% of workers in Russia work illegally a vast majority from Tajikistan.

The current effectiveness and loyalty of the 201st division is questionable at best.



Why is it important to review this policy now?

The growing instability in the region makes it pertinent to assess implications on current Russian Foreign Policy to increase influence in Central Asia.



The bilateral relationship with the US needs revisiting in the context of the current surge in troops in Afghanistan and the US growing influence in Central Asia as a whole in the context of the Northern Distribution Network and Tajikistan in particular. President Obama’s strategy on the war on terror could be adversely impacted hampered by a collapse of the government and would do little for a policy of continued support.



Similarly Russia’s bilateral relationship with China whose growing economy is impacted by energy shortages forms another dimension impacted from continued instability in the region. This warrants at least being flagged as an agenda item.



What to do about the Three “Bilateral Relations” (Russia-China-US) in Central Asia ?

United States: Due to war on terror in Afghanistan and President Obama’s Operation Moshtaraks surge in troops, there is a sharp increase in the US military and political presence in Central Asia. There is concern about the willingness of Central Asian states to expand their cooperation with US even at the expense of Russian interests. The ‘recognition game’ cannot be ignored and matters of identity cannot be overshadowed by interests as a fall in the regime of President Rakhmon is most certainly likely to mean the US will strive to increase recognition as a player in the region. Again a multilateral approach within the following institutions is likely to yield positive results: CSTO, CIS and OSCE. This represents a potential platform for a reiteration of Russian Policy against permanent or long term US military presence in the region looking likely based on reports suggesting security after completion of Operation Moshtarak will be difficult.



China: There is no imminent action here and the Moscow-Beijing bipartisan consensus in favour of multilateral strategy to combat threats to regional security stands.



An impending coup brings these higher up the agenda.

In the short term:

1. Commission urgent report to critically assess the views of Dushanbe Mayor Makhmasaid Ubaidulloyev and the Deputy Premier Murodali Alimardon on the role of all regional security frameworks and organizations (CIS, CSTO and OSCE). It is pertinent to highlight any differences with Russian Policy. Moscow’s mayor Yuri Luzhkov and the former Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov both have close relationships with Ubaidulloyev and it would be advisable to seek their opinion.

2. State publicly that support for Tajikistan is based on political pluralism and institutional reform, not a specific leader.

3. Warn the government that any behaviour in that contradicts the basic premise of the Treaty on European Security undermines regional security.

4. Forward copies to Kazakhstan of the joint statement on Treaty on European Security (which Tajikistan supports) presented at the 17th meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council held on 18th November last year. Kazakhstan, chairing the OSCE in 2010 and also acquiescent to the treaty should be embraced as an advocate able to prioritize this on the agenda. It may be appropriate to arrange a phone call to the Foreign Minister, Kanat Saudabayev.



 These short term measures could underscore to any new administration that whilst they still have some Russian support, they cannot continue to ignore internal issues like Rakhmon.

 However knowledge that Russia hedged its bets in a time a crisis by courting either Luzhkov or Ubaidulloyev whilst supporting Rakhmon could inflame internal divisions and create an atmosphere of distrust.



In the medium term:

1. Take advantage of influence of Russia’s current Chairmanship of the CIS to

a. Call for any incumbent administration to open political space and a transparent political system – security guarantees may be needed for top state officials in case the government is defeated.

b. Create acquiescence to the Treaty on European Security.

2. Strengthen relationship with SCO and promote activities of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a key instrument to maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS area. The CSTO anti-terror drill in Tajikistan in April 2010, codenamed Rubezh 2010 , is another opportunity to do this.

3. Use Russian permanent member status of the UN as leverage to approve intervention in Tajikistan in a peacekeeping mission as was successfully done during the civil war i.e. ‘Russian soldiers with blue helmets’.



 United Nations intervention as a peacekeeping mission is likely to be supported by US and China and that will help enhance these key bilateral relationships.

 The US and Western Europe are however unlikely to fully support European Security Treaty and NATO likely to be their choice.






Bibliography

(2009). Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic Crisis. International Crisis Group.



Johnson, L. (2004). Vladimir Putin and Central Asia. New York: I.B. Tauris.



Jonson, L. (2001). Russia and Central Asia. In R. Allison, & L. Jonson, Central Asian Securtiy - The New International Context (pp. 95-126). London and Washington DC: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Brookings Institution Press.



Rubin, B. R. (1994). Tajikistan: From Soviet Republic to Russian-Uzbek Protectorate. In M. Mandelbaum, Central Asia and the World (pp. 207-224). New York: Council on Foreign Relations.



Sengupta, A. (2005). Russia, China and Multilaterism in Central Asia. New Delhi: Shipra Publications.



Solodovnik, S. (1998). The Tajikistan conflict as a regional security dilemma. In R. Allison, & C. Bluth, Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia (pp. 230-240). London: Royal Institue of International Affairs.



(2009). Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure. International Crisis Group.



Trofimov, D. (2009). Russian Foreign Policy Objectives in Central Asia. Russian Regional Perspectives Journal , 1 (2), 14-16.







As of today there are about one million of Tajik citizens in Russia. About 73,000 citizens of Tajikistan left for Russia in January this year. Source: BBC Monitoring Central Asia


A recent World Bank paper estimates that roughly half the money in the country comes from workers abroad - the highest level in the world. Ninety-eight percent of those remittances originate in Russia, according to the Asian Development Bank. In 2008 remittances formed around 49% of Tajikistan’s GDP. Based on an estimate of World Bank Remittances data, after almost doubling every year since 2002, it is expected to fall by almost 40% in 2009 and 2010.

Source: Tajikistan Country Profile from http://news.bbc.co.uk

A press release by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) stated: ‘Despite certain positive steps, Tajikistan’s parliamentary elections failed to meet many key OSCE commitments’ Dushanbe March 1st 2010 - http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/item_1_42856.html

20th April 2009 According to Reuters ‘Tajikistan, U.S. Afghan transit deal expected soon’ – The Central Asian country of Tajikistan will soon allow the Unites States to send non-military cargo through its territory for troops fighting in neighbouring Afghanistan’ Source: http://iworks.factiva.com The same report mentions Russia as willing to cooperate on the transit of non-military cargo to Afghanistan for the United States but has not yet made any agreements with Washington.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation is available on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mid.ru) with Section IV detailing Regional Priorities.

(Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic Crisis, 2009)

The draft European Security Treaty can be found at http://www.mid.ru with articles emphasizing that no parties to the treaty take any actions that affect the security of any other party. It promotes cooperation, transparency and consultation. In the event of attack or threat of such an ‘Extraordinary Conference’ may agree on collective measures. Analysts agree that the treaty benefits Russia’s security but the US security interests differ markedly. The potential is to prevent any unilateral action in Central Asia that the US might want to take in the region in its fight against terrorism campaign. For more information go to http://iworks.factiva.com ‘News Analysis: Strategic considerations behind Russian proposal for new European security treaty.’

(Trofimov, 2009)

With a rare exception commanding officers of Russia’s 201st Motorized Rifle Division

(Sengupta, 2005)

Ibid.

Chairman of the Upper House and Mayor of Dushanbe

Former Chairman of the National Bank and Deputy Premier

As far back as 2005, Makmudsaid Ubaidulloyev has been cited by many independent political analysts as a possible successor to President Rakhmon. He is reputedly pro-Russian in his political orientation. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav041905.shtml

(Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, 2009)

‘CSTO to hold joint anti-terror drill in Tajikistan in April’ 1 March 2010 Xinhua News Agency.

The Ambassador - Inside the Life of a Working Diplomat

At the almost obligatory post GDSP tutorial drinks in the student union bar, I was struck by how a number of us were feeling overwhelmed with the demanding schedule and plethora of skills we are acquiring and expected to acquire for a career in diplomacy. The discussion progressed into expressing the anticipation of the feeling of relief when the course is over and we've got 'that job', how life would be great ... I conjured images of sipping champagne at glamorous residences and the background noise of chit chat of subjects of immense global impact on the world we live in.




Mauya, George and I then entered a fairly passionate discussion about what it REALLY meant to be an Ambassador and the real challenges one might face in such a career. The discussion made me recollect a book I read just before starting this course which cited a number of classical and contemporary analyses of what personal and professional characteristics an ambassador must have. The book by John Shaw titled 'The Ambassador - Inside the Life of a Working Diplomat' was an inside view of the experience of Jan Eliasson, the Swedish Ambassador to Washington during the pertinent period from 2000 to 2005 who was considered by many as one of the most skilled and accomplished diplomats.



If you feel overwhelmed, I want you to consider this:



Ottaviano Maggi, writing in 1596, set a high standard for what it takes to be an ambassador.

"An ambassador should be a trained theologian, should be well versed in Aristotle and Plato, and should be able at a moment's notice to solve the most abstruse problems in correct dialectical form; he should also be expert in mathematics, architecture, music, physics, and civil and canon law," he declared. "He should speak and write Latin fluently and must be proficient in Greek, Spanish, French, German and Turkish. While being a trained classical scholar, a historian, a geographer, and an expert in military science, he must also have a cultured taste for poetry. And above all he must be of excellent family, rich and endowed with a fine physical presence." (Mayer, The Diplomats).



All I can say is I'm glad I'm not doing this course in the 16th century :-)



Francois de Callieres, a French diplomat, described the work of ambassadors in exalted terms in a classical essay written in 1716 titled "On the Manner of Negotiation with Princes." An ambassador, he wrote, "indeed resembles in a certain sense the actor placed before the eyes of the public in order that he may play a great part, for his profession raises him above the ordinary condition of mankind and makes him into some sort the equal of the masters of the earth by that right representation which attaches to his service and by the special relations which his offices give him the mighty ones of the earth."



De Callieres sees diplomacy and the work of an ambassador as a high calling and declares a good ambassador as worth his weight in gold. The French Diplomat also provides a list of required qualities for the ambassador that mirrors those of Ottaviano Maggi:



"An ambassador must have an observant mind, a spirit of application which refuses to be distracted by pleasures or frivolous amusements, a sound judgment which takes the measure of things as they are, and which goes straight to its goal by the shortest and most natural paths without wandering into useless refinements and subtleties which as a rule only succeed in repelling those with whom one is dealing. The negotiator must further possess that penetration which enables him to discover the thoughts of men and to know by the least movement of their countenances what passions are stirring within, for such movements are often betrayed even by the most practiced negotiator. He must also have a mind so fertile in expedients as easily to smooth away the difficulties which he meets in the course of his duty; he must have presence of mind to find a quick and pregnant reply even to unforeseen surprises, and by such judicious replies he must be able to recover himself when his foot has slipped. An equable humour, a tranquil and patient nature, always ready to listen with attention to those whom he meets ; an address always open, genial, civil, agreeable, with easy and ingratiating manners which assist largely in making a favourable impression upon those around him these things are the indispensable adjuncts to the negotiator's profession. Their opposite, the grave and cold air, a melancholy or rough exterior, may create a first impression which is not easily removed. Above all the good negotiator must have sufficient control over himself to resist the longing to speak before he has really thought what he shall say." (Francois de Callieres)

Best,
Saheed

American Empire?

The unending debate on the existence of an American empire is compounded by the use by numerous scholars of the outdated framework of analysis which frequently compares this twentieth century phenomenon with previous empires such as the British and Roman Empires. Whilst there is a requisite to have a point of reference of comparison to define empire, this essay says there is a “new American Empire” and seeks to show that where comparative historiography is the foremost framework of analysis, it weakens the argument of those who say there is no American Empire. Marxists continue to focus on the lack of rivalry between imperial powers and a post-modernistic concept of empire without a centre and none of these allows us to understand the form of imperialism, uniquely embodied in the American State, which has emerged in the contemporary era . However the clarity of distinction between the hub and spoke nature of empire featuring direct and territorial rule and the more contemporary recognizable multilateral approach in acquiring hegemony status cannot be ignored. Nevertheless it is argued that emphasizing the distinction between hegemony and empire as a basis of substantiation that there is no American empire is inadequate. These distinctions, invariably a discourse in the context of anarchy and hierarchy play less significance than is often associated in determining if the American unipolar order is a latter day empire of something new. Finally this essay argues that most debates surrounding empire is narrow and too focused and don’t give equal weighting to features of empire as relating to all dimensions such as Military, Economic and Cultural. If defined broad enough, most scholars would acquiesce to the existence of an American Empire.


The first section introduces the origin of the empire debate and key actors and their arguments. It then looks at various scholarly attempts at definitions of hegemony and empire and the role of power and sovereignty in assessing and theorizing American empire. This is intentionally not a long drawn assessment of the difference between unipolarity, hegemony and empire as some scholars such as Nexus and Thomas have done . That represents only one facet of the framework for analysis. Though a strong framework, in isolation it could be problematic and lead to an inaccurate conclusion of the non-existence of an American Empire. After this is an exploration of the dominant dimensions used as a basis of empirical analysis to ‘measure’ what constitutes an empire – military, economic and cultural. By assessing each of these dimensions with more contemporary events in the period of 9/11 and the second Gulf war in Iraq in 2003 and outlining the combination of arguments that both support and discount the notion of an American empire for each event, it starts to become evident why there might be a growing acquiescent of the existence of an American Empire.

There are essentially two identifiable prominent periods when the debate surrounding the reality of American empire intensified – the end of the cold war and 9/11. The first was what Charles Krauthammer refers to as ‘the Unipolar Moment’ . At this moment the US was in the enviable position of unparalleled military and economic strength and viewed to have also won the ideological war against communism. David Ludden argued Americans are only recently beginning to understand their imperial history which has remained largely invisible. By comparing and contrasting the ‘old days of Imperialism’ before 1945, he concurs that ‘imperialism acquired a new format under American leadership.” It can be said that the cold war, globalization, security and terrorism justified US expansion militarily, economically and politically. Michael Cox said the political order of nation states made the term empire outdated as one country could not legally administer another. If on this basis alone there is no American empire, then there probably cannot be any other empire. Cox’s implication of an outdated definition could suggest an up to date definition where legal administration over another state was not a pre-requisite would make it easier for America to be classified as an empire. This could be one reason Antonio Negri felt the need to write ‘Reflections on Empire’, an ‘update’ on his original work ‘Empire’? The second period of intensified American empire debate was after 9/11 and the run up to the war in Iraq. Intriguingly, Antonio Negri commented that the attacks on New York and Washington did not change the condition of sovereignty but revealed a change that had already taken place – the inadequacy of any substantial notion of sovereignty. Negri states “In our current transition towards Empire, the sovereignty of the dominant nation states is being compromised, while sovereignty is being transformed by, a new imperial power, supranational, tending towards global control.” America comes to mind.

American Hegemony, understood as domination of the unipolar world since the end of the cold war, and the reality of its preponderance on power, military and economic, today is in little doubt. One perspective describes hegemony as the first step on the way to empire. Admittedly, hegemony does not represent an indispensable prerequisite to building empire especially considering the divide and rule characteristic of previous empires. However, Imperial ambition or American ‘neoimperial grand strategy’ , is too strong a temptation to avoid for the dominant power in a unipolar order. John Ikenberry agrees that ‘unipolarity does generate imperial temptations’, but adds using empire alone to describe the political order around American power in inadequate. This in his view is new without historical antecedent. This is the same ‘new imperialism’ however that Michael Mann argued would create more terrorists and rogue states and a less influential America. According to Robert Jervis, “Great power also instills new fears in the dominant state. A hegemon tends to acquire an enormous stake in world order. As power expands, so does a state’s definition of its own interests.” Only where empire exclusively means ‘direct rule over foreign territories without any political representation of their inhabitants’, Niall Ferguson explains, will the distinction between hegemony and empire be correct. Those who say there is no American empire emphasize that the sovereignty of the nation state was pertinent to the imperialism of European states. However, according to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, sovereignty has taken a new global form comprising a combination of national and supranational united under a single logic of rule. This they call Empire. Recognizing this new form of sovereignty changes the terms of the American empire debate. Similarly if the definition is broad enough, America can be considered an empire, and if narrow enough a conclusion reached that it is not one.

Nexon and Wright highlight extensively the problem with scholars attempting to address the American empire debate without focusing on how aspects of imperial dynamics compare to unipolar and hegemonic orders. They argue that ideal-typical empires are different from hegemonic and unipolar orders as they ‘rule through intermediaries’ and ‘heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political communities’. By graphically illustrating numerous relational perspectives between predominant and lesser powers they compare unipolarity, various forms of hegemony and empire. They found the first two relatively straightforward. On empire, despite a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the concept, however, scholars and commentators agree on many characteristics of empires. Most argue that empires are multiethnic polities, that they involve the dominance of one polity over other political communities and that core-periphery relations are an important component. Nexon and Wright note: “By themselves, however, these characteristics fail to distinguish “empires” from “hegemonies.” They also do not, in of themselves, suggest a spare set of structural dynamics. On features of empire most agree with, America is a hegemonic power with ‘neoimperial grand strategy’



Military Dimension: How much has power got to do with it?

There are two conspicuously absent criticisms in the role of military power in the debate surrounding the existence of an American empire. The first is the degree to which the discourse is skewed in favor of citing military as the predominant source of US imperial ambitions. The second is the lack of recognition that the debate goes far beyond the number of air force bases the US has or the fact that defense expenditure is double that of the rest of the top 6 nations combined. In the first case, it is telling that the ‘Project for the new American Century’ pays such little attention in its extensive policy analysis documents to anything other than security and defense from a military perspective. Brooks and Wohlforth are more careful in avoiding this pitfall and highlight that what distinguishes the International system is American dominance in both military and economic categories simultaneously. On the second point that it’s not just about having power, but its impact and how it’s used. Robert Jervis notes in his review of Brooks’ and Wohlforths book , that even though the conclusion that size matters may be incorrect from the standpoint of much of political science, they dispute claims of the proponents of the three leading paradigms in international politics – realism, liberalism and constructivism that the current American predominance in the International System should generate balancing dynamics that should restrain the United States. However it mustn’t be downplayed that if empire is about winning conflicts and agenda setting, a strong military such as the American forces is important.



Economic Dimension: Whose invisible hand?

After a sustained period of ‘empire by denial’, many neoconservatives are now talking with pride of a “new American empire” which has a new face hiding behind the dominant military and political power. This face of international economic rules and rule making organizations help a hegemon apply its power. Though not necessarily always applicable it is necessary to state the obvious that economic preponderance precedes military power. It does for America and according to Robert Wade, this is America’s invisible hand. Michael Mann has a different metaphor in his arguments suggesting a drive towards imperial incoherence resulting from uneven power resources: a ‘military giant’ and ‘Back-seat economic driver’. Economists like numbers and so presumably Empire economists like big numbers because it represents power. Having $13 billion in GDP representing more than a quarter of the worlds GDP, the US numbers are impressive. Not enough to impress Mann. Even though he admits these are ‘substantial imperial powers’, he insists the US is only a Back-seat driver being unable to directly control foreign investors or economies and limited powers over big economies like Russia, India and China. His assessment of how much control the America really has starts by looking at the carrot and stick approach in this dimension – sanctions and development aid respectively. For the former to be effective requires international organization. For the latter to be a force for global development, it just isn’t enough. Mann uses the word ‘puny’. The failure of US carrots and sticks to win a majority in the UN Security Council over the invasion of Iraq could be cited as evidence of this. However could this really be an argument that the US has limited influence economically as required by an empire? Mann actually contradicts his argument when he suggests that many promises of aid made by the US at the time of the UN vote over Iraq in 1991 were not upheld and this led to distrust of the US to fulfill its pledges. He continued his analogy by saying “This back-seat driver will not pay for the gas. It is difficult to build an Empire without spending money.” This actually weakens the argument of the potential influence of carrots and sticks and points more to a failure of implementing policy. It could be safely assumed that if the US did fulfill all its pledges in 1991, which it had the resources to do, its influence could have been capitalized on in 2003.

The financial and economic meltdown in 2008 has transformed whispers of doubts of American Hegemony into more audible voices. This has brought back into the limelight the question of the benefits and logic of neoliberalism and free trade. This however only lends itself to the debate about the decline of American empire and not as much about its existence. It is paradoxical to talk about the decline of something that doesn’t exist. The US has numerous economic challenges such as a large trade deficit, the growing influence of the European Union as a region of economic influence and the Euro’s growing popularity even though the Dollar’s reserves globally are still huge and the City of London’s rise as a global financial centre. Can any of these be conclusively cited as evidence that there has never been an American Empire and undermine its global influence?



Cultural Dimension: Liberalism or Empire?

Many scholars still find value in comparing America with European Imperial Powers to identify similarities, but more importantly, differences. One distinction is qualitative. The goal and desire of power dominance are the same but the approach to achieving this differs. The importance of ‘soft power’ in America’s foreign policy has had no stronger advocate than Joseph Nye, who says “it comes from being a shining city upon a hill.” Winning conflicts, agenda setting and shaping normality are characteristics of imperialism. According to Nye: “Winning the peace is harder than winning a war, and soft power is essential to winning the peace.” Upon further analysis, the attraction of the American way of life as a magnet or even as missionary is not far removed from the British. The British Empire also actively sought to make its values attractive to others and to spread Christianity. Ferguson explains in a historical context how administrators applied their notions of law and order and the noticeable impact of the use of the BBC in the 1930s is viewed as more than the soft power of the United States today. In the more recent events of 9/11 leading up to the war on Iraq, President Bush’s West Point address evokes American values and speaks of a fight for a just ‘peace that favors human liberty’. Whilst the speech reminded graduates of ‘the challenge of imperial communism’ – Korea to Berlin, to Vietnam, and in the Cold War from beginning to end, the US does face two ‘logics of order’. Ikenberry cites an order based around liberalism and one around imperialism, the former with prominent features of the post-1945 Western system and the latter around unilateralism, divide and rule strategies and coercive domination. Edward Rhodes talks about these two logics of order and combines them to describe ‘The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda’ arguing that America’s return to Wilsonian Internationalism doesn’t mean that a liberal order based on human liberty and consent, will not require the exercise of power. America has demonstrated in numerous instances little hesitation in exercising this power. Power here, military or otherwise could be interpreted to be the hegemonic characteristic of an empire. This speech reflects a slight contradiction though. On the one hand it serves as a proponent to the power of an idea - in this case, American Exceptionalism, and hence the propensity to aspire to win conflicts, set the agenda and shape normality. On the other hand however, the speech fails in its attempt to disguise its imperial nature. By emphasizing ‘imperial communism’ as what America has confronted diplomatically, economically, militarily and the victory of ‘moral clarity’, President Bush almost illustrates the proverbial fingers pointing back at you when you point one finger at someone else. There is almost the subliminal admission of the existence of the opposite of imperial communism - imperial liberalism.

Jean Bricmont talks about using Human Rights to sell war and explains that since the end of the Cold War, the idea of human rights has been made into a justification for intervention by the world's leading economic and military powers—above all, the United States—in countries that are vulnerable to their attacks. The criteria for such intervention have become more arbitrary and self-serving, and their form more destructive, from Yugoslavia to Afghanistan to Iraq. Until the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the large parts of the left was often complicit in this ideology of intervention-discovering new “Hitlers” as the need arose, and denouncing antiwar arguments as appeasement on the model of Munich in 1938. This ‘Humanitarian Imperialism’ can be argued represents the character of the new American empire. Noam Chomsky agrees describing this as “the new doctrine of Imperial Right” and notes how this was unhampered by superpower rivalry. America hasn’t shied away from playing a leading imperial type role in this growing norm of Humanitarian Intervention in corners of the globe as far flung as Somalia or Sudan.



Conclusion

The prevalent framework for the discourse and debate on the existence of an American empire is at best inadequate and at worst flawed. It focuses too much on the thin line between the definition of what constitutes a hegemonic power and an empire. By attempting to compare formal and informal empire such as the British and Roman empires with this ‘new American empire’ is fraught with problematic analysis if it ignores the changing political landscape. By limiting the features of empire to military power or having the argument weighted favorably in that context further compounds this. It demonstrates that if the characteristics and features for inclusion into what constitutes an empire is wide enough the conclusion of the existence of an American empire is invariably reached. Conversely, if narrow enough, there is no American empire. Proponents and Opponents alike customarily meander towards a definition to the extent to which substantiates their claim. However the impact and not just the existence of all sources and dimensions of hegemonic power – military, economic and cultural – are considered, more boxes than not are ticked and the argument for the existence of an American empire is more plausible. Evidence for this can be found in contemporary events such as 9/11 and the war on terror. Here’s a final thought – The unprecedented interest from all corners of the globe in the recent US presidential elections in November 2008, conjures up images, not that far removed from Roman times, of subjects from all over the world eager to know who the next emperor would be.



 

Bibliography

Bricmont, J. (2006). Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War. (D. Johnstone, Trans.) New York: Monthly Review Press.



Brooks, S. G., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2002). American Primacy in Perspective. Foreign Affairs , 81 (4), 20-33.



Brooks, S. G., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2008). World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.



Chomsky, N. (2008). Humaitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right. Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine , 60 (4), 22-50.



Ferguson, N. (2004). Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire. London: Allen Lane.



Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.



Ikenberry, J. G. (2002). America's Imperial Ambition - The Lures of Pre-emption. Foreign Affairs , 81 (5), 44-60.



Ikenberry, J. G. (2004). Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age. Review of International Studies , 30 (4), 609-630.



Jervis, R. (2003). The Compulsive Empire. Foreign Policy (137), 83-87.



Johnson, C. (2006). Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic. New York: Metropolitan Books.



Krauthammer, C. (1990). The Unipolar Moment. Foreign Affairs , 70 (1), 23-33.



Ludden, D. (2004). America's Invisible Empire. Economic & Political Weekly , 39 (44), 4776-4777.



Mann, M. (2003). Incoherent Empire. London/New York: Verso.



Negri, A. (2008). Reflections on Empire. Cambridge: Polity.



Nexon, D. H., & Thomas, W. (2007). What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate. American Political Science Review , 101 (2), 253-271.



Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.



Nye, J. S. (2002). The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.



Panitch, L., & Gindin, S. (2006). Theorizing American Empire. In A. Bartholomew, Empire's Law (p. 21). London: Pluto Press.



Posen, B. R. (2003). Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony. International Security , 28 (1), 5-46.



Rhodes, E. (2003). The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda. Survival , 45 (1), 131-154.



Wade, R. H. (2003). The invisible hand of the American empire. Ethics & International Affairs , 17 (2), 77-88.