Tajikistan: Collapsing from within ... What next for Security Policy?

Tajikistan: Collapsing from within ... What next for Security Policy?




Recent Events

A number of fragile economic factors and internal political instability is threatening security in the region. An uncertain future for Tajik migrant workers in Russia, a looming energy security crisis and decline in Aluminium revenues is creating a difficult environment for the government of President Rakhmon further exacerbated by attacks near Afghanistan and Uzbekistan by the Taliban and Islamic Movement respectively.



Recommendations

In the event of collapse, enhance security in the region by supporting new administration whilst providing security guarantees for new and previous government officials.



Prior and after any collapse: It is essential to understand current internal political situation and transition scenarios and maintain key bilateral relationships by

 Taking advantage of Russia’s current chairmanship of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to increase influence in the region, pressing for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as an instrument so as to play a key role in any potential interventions in the event of any state collapse.

 Providing support to maintain security but publicly issue gentle warnings to President Rakhmon now, the new administration in the event of a collapse and the International community concerning any belligerence to resolving the internal instability caused by the energy shortage, failing economy, rising Islamic militancy as a consequence of the porous border.

 Enhance cooperation with the US in use of the Northern Distribution Network for supplying security in the region and facilitating President Obama’s recent surge of troops in Afghanistan as part of Operation Moshtarak.



What has brought this about?

President Rakhmon has for a while paid little attention to domestic crisis such as labour migration , energy shortages and protection for his people. Economically Tajikistan has been in the balance relying on aid and remittances from migrant labour and a growing dependence on this against a backdrop of the global economic crisis is unsustainable.



Rakhmon – Past, Present and Future

Since 1994 Russian backed Rakhmon, now in his third term as President, has been pro-Soviet. However, his historically firm grip on power and substantial public support is waning fast .

At the moment, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to cite the current crisis as the beginning of his demise. The OSCE reported the recent parliamentary elections in February were fraught with irregularities and that has added to challenges to his legitimacy and hold on power.



 

What pressure points for Russia?

• The level of social unrest is unprecedented. The energy situation is deteriorating and is much worse than the winter crises of 2008 and 2009. Economy is weak. This means increasing pressure on Russia to demonstrate multidimensional support for any new regime – politically, economically and militarily even if this policy stance becomes untenable.

• Afghanistan preoccupies President Rakhmon and rightly so. The porous border is one of the main routes for drugs on their way to Russia. Rakhmon has used this though as leverage with US and NATO following their growing concern regarding Pakistan’s inability to provide a reliable military supply route . Russia faces even more pressure from US and the West to continue to act as necessary to stem drug trade and activities of Taliban and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. If Rakhmons administration collapses, Moscow may be faced with the conundrum of extension of US/NATO bases from temporary to more permanent that are within striking distance of Afghanistan and a failed state such as Tajikistan – a haven for Islamist extremism.



What is the current Russian Security Policy in Central Asia and Tajikistan and is it effective?

Multilateral Institutions: Russia advocates CSTO to be as strong as NATO as a key instrument to maintain stability and security in region in order to prevent risks of destabilization and the CIS as an instrument of multilateral political dialogue.

Economically to strengthen the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) as common economic space in region and support the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The economic crisis has forced a recent cutback in migration labour quotas from 3.9 million reduced to 1.95 million.

Security: The 101st airborne division continued existence as part of 1999 Russo-Tajik Agreement to set up a Military base in Tajikistan with Russian forces still providing reinforcements to Tajiks guarding the external borders of Tajikistan. To actively promote the

European Security Treaty



In the current environment there is a limited success on this broad policy.

Russia’s military presence in Tajikistan has been very effective in tackling internal or regional security matters, but has not been used as a long term leverage to meet Russia’s long term political and economic interests. The Multilateral organizations (CIS, CSTO, EurAsEC, SCO) have helped Russia absorb shock of declining influence by providing their own checks and balances and continued advocacy and strengthening of this is advised.

The cutback in labour migration has had little effect because as much as 65% of workers in Russia work illegally a vast majority from Tajikistan.

The current effectiveness and loyalty of the 201st division is questionable at best.



Why is it important to review this policy now?

The growing instability in the region makes it pertinent to assess implications on current Russian Foreign Policy to increase influence in Central Asia.



The bilateral relationship with the US needs revisiting in the context of the current surge in troops in Afghanistan and the US growing influence in Central Asia as a whole in the context of the Northern Distribution Network and Tajikistan in particular. President Obama’s strategy on the war on terror could be adversely impacted hampered by a collapse of the government and would do little for a policy of continued support.



Similarly Russia’s bilateral relationship with China whose growing economy is impacted by energy shortages forms another dimension impacted from continued instability in the region. This warrants at least being flagged as an agenda item.



What to do about the Three “Bilateral Relations” (Russia-China-US) in Central Asia ?

United States: Due to war on terror in Afghanistan and President Obama’s Operation Moshtaraks surge in troops, there is a sharp increase in the US military and political presence in Central Asia. There is concern about the willingness of Central Asian states to expand their cooperation with US even at the expense of Russian interests. The ‘recognition game’ cannot be ignored and matters of identity cannot be overshadowed by interests as a fall in the regime of President Rakhmon is most certainly likely to mean the US will strive to increase recognition as a player in the region. Again a multilateral approach within the following institutions is likely to yield positive results: CSTO, CIS and OSCE. This represents a potential platform for a reiteration of Russian Policy against permanent or long term US military presence in the region looking likely based on reports suggesting security after completion of Operation Moshtarak will be difficult.



China: There is no imminent action here and the Moscow-Beijing bipartisan consensus in favour of multilateral strategy to combat threats to regional security stands.



An impending coup brings these higher up the agenda.

In the short term:

1. Commission urgent report to critically assess the views of Dushanbe Mayor Makhmasaid Ubaidulloyev and the Deputy Premier Murodali Alimardon on the role of all regional security frameworks and organizations (CIS, CSTO and OSCE). It is pertinent to highlight any differences with Russian Policy. Moscow’s mayor Yuri Luzhkov and the former Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov both have close relationships with Ubaidulloyev and it would be advisable to seek their opinion.

2. State publicly that support for Tajikistan is based on political pluralism and institutional reform, not a specific leader.

3. Warn the government that any behaviour in that contradicts the basic premise of the Treaty on European Security undermines regional security.

4. Forward copies to Kazakhstan of the joint statement on Treaty on European Security (which Tajikistan supports) presented at the 17th meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council held on 18th November last year. Kazakhstan, chairing the OSCE in 2010 and also acquiescent to the treaty should be embraced as an advocate able to prioritize this on the agenda. It may be appropriate to arrange a phone call to the Foreign Minister, Kanat Saudabayev.



 These short term measures could underscore to any new administration that whilst they still have some Russian support, they cannot continue to ignore internal issues like Rakhmon.

 However knowledge that Russia hedged its bets in a time a crisis by courting either Luzhkov or Ubaidulloyev whilst supporting Rakhmon could inflame internal divisions and create an atmosphere of distrust.



In the medium term:

1. Take advantage of influence of Russia’s current Chairmanship of the CIS to

a. Call for any incumbent administration to open political space and a transparent political system – security guarantees may be needed for top state officials in case the government is defeated.

b. Create acquiescence to the Treaty on European Security.

2. Strengthen relationship with SCO and promote activities of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a key instrument to maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS area. The CSTO anti-terror drill in Tajikistan in April 2010, codenamed Rubezh 2010 , is another opportunity to do this.

3. Use Russian permanent member status of the UN as leverage to approve intervention in Tajikistan in a peacekeeping mission as was successfully done during the civil war i.e. ‘Russian soldiers with blue helmets’.



 United Nations intervention as a peacekeeping mission is likely to be supported by US and China and that will help enhance these key bilateral relationships.

 The US and Western Europe are however unlikely to fully support European Security Treaty and NATO likely to be their choice.






Bibliography

(2009). Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic Crisis. International Crisis Group.



Johnson, L. (2004). Vladimir Putin and Central Asia. New York: I.B. Tauris.



Jonson, L. (2001). Russia and Central Asia. In R. Allison, & L. Jonson, Central Asian Securtiy - The New International Context (pp. 95-126). London and Washington DC: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Brookings Institution Press.



Rubin, B. R. (1994). Tajikistan: From Soviet Republic to Russian-Uzbek Protectorate. In M. Mandelbaum, Central Asia and the World (pp. 207-224). New York: Council on Foreign Relations.



Sengupta, A. (2005). Russia, China and Multilaterism in Central Asia. New Delhi: Shipra Publications.



Solodovnik, S. (1998). The Tajikistan conflict as a regional security dilemma. In R. Allison, & C. Bluth, Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia (pp. 230-240). London: Royal Institue of International Affairs.



(2009). Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure. International Crisis Group.



Trofimov, D. (2009). Russian Foreign Policy Objectives in Central Asia. Russian Regional Perspectives Journal , 1 (2), 14-16.







As of today there are about one million of Tajik citizens in Russia. About 73,000 citizens of Tajikistan left for Russia in January this year. Source: BBC Monitoring Central Asia


A recent World Bank paper estimates that roughly half the money in the country comes from workers abroad - the highest level in the world. Ninety-eight percent of those remittances originate in Russia, according to the Asian Development Bank. In 2008 remittances formed around 49% of Tajikistan’s GDP. Based on an estimate of World Bank Remittances data, after almost doubling every year since 2002, it is expected to fall by almost 40% in 2009 and 2010.

Source: Tajikistan Country Profile from http://news.bbc.co.uk

A press release by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) stated: ‘Despite certain positive steps, Tajikistan’s parliamentary elections failed to meet many key OSCE commitments’ Dushanbe March 1st 2010 - http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/item_1_42856.html

20th April 2009 According to Reuters ‘Tajikistan, U.S. Afghan transit deal expected soon’ – The Central Asian country of Tajikistan will soon allow the Unites States to send non-military cargo through its territory for troops fighting in neighbouring Afghanistan’ Source: http://iworks.factiva.com The same report mentions Russia as willing to cooperate on the transit of non-military cargo to Afghanistan for the United States but has not yet made any agreements with Washington.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation is available on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mid.ru) with Section IV detailing Regional Priorities.

(Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic Crisis, 2009)

The draft European Security Treaty can be found at http://www.mid.ru with articles emphasizing that no parties to the treaty take any actions that affect the security of any other party. It promotes cooperation, transparency and consultation. In the event of attack or threat of such an ‘Extraordinary Conference’ may agree on collective measures. Analysts agree that the treaty benefits Russia’s security but the US security interests differ markedly. The potential is to prevent any unilateral action in Central Asia that the US might want to take in the region in its fight against terrorism campaign. For more information go to http://iworks.factiva.com ‘News Analysis: Strategic considerations behind Russian proposal for new European security treaty.’

(Trofimov, 2009)

With a rare exception commanding officers of Russia’s 201st Motorized Rifle Division

(Sengupta, 2005)

Ibid.

Chairman of the Upper House and Mayor of Dushanbe

Former Chairman of the National Bank and Deputy Premier

As far back as 2005, Makmudsaid Ubaidulloyev has been cited by many independent political analysts as a possible successor to President Rakhmon. He is reputedly pro-Russian in his political orientation. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav041905.shtml

(Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, 2009)

‘CSTO to hold joint anti-terror drill in Tajikistan in April’ 1 March 2010 Xinhua News Agency.

The Ambassador - Inside the Life of a Working Diplomat

At the almost obligatory post GDSP tutorial drinks in the student union bar, I was struck by how a number of us were feeling overwhelmed with the demanding schedule and plethora of skills we are acquiring and expected to acquire for a career in diplomacy. The discussion progressed into expressing the anticipation of the feeling of relief when the course is over and we've got 'that job', how life would be great ... I conjured images of sipping champagne at glamorous residences and the background noise of chit chat of subjects of immense global impact on the world we live in.




Mauya, George and I then entered a fairly passionate discussion about what it REALLY meant to be an Ambassador and the real challenges one might face in such a career. The discussion made me recollect a book I read just before starting this course which cited a number of classical and contemporary analyses of what personal and professional characteristics an ambassador must have. The book by John Shaw titled 'The Ambassador - Inside the Life of a Working Diplomat' was an inside view of the experience of Jan Eliasson, the Swedish Ambassador to Washington during the pertinent period from 2000 to 2005 who was considered by many as one of the most skilled and accomplished diplomats.



If you feel overwhelmed, I want you to consider this:



Ottaviano Maggi, writing in 1596, set a high standard for what it takes to be an ambassador.

"An ambassador should be a trained theologian, should be well versed in Aristotle and Plato, and should be able at a moment's notice to solve the most abstruse problems in correct dialectical form; he should also be expert in mathematics, architecture, music, physics, and civil and canon law," he declared. "He should speak and write Latin fluently and must be proficient in Greek, Spanish, French, German and Turkish. While being a trained classical scholar, a historian, a geographer, and an expert in military science, he must also have a cultured taste for poetry. And above all he must be of excellent family, rich and endowed with a fine physical presence." (Mayer, The Diplomats).



All I can say is I'm glad I'm not doing this course in the 16th century :-)



Francois de Callieres, a French diplomat, described the work of ambassadors in exalted terms in a classical essay written in 1716 titled "On the Manner of Negotiation with Princes." An ambassador, he wrote, "indeed resembles in a certain sense the actor placed before the eyes of the public in order that he may play a great part, for his profession raises him above the ordinary condition of mankind and makes him into some sort the equal of the masters of the earth by that right representation which attaches to his service and by the special relations which his offices give him the mighty ones of the earth."



De Callieres sees diplomacy and the work of an ambassador as a high calling and declares a good ambassador as worth his weight in gold. The French Diplomat also provides a list of required qualities for the ambassador that mirrors those of Ottaviano Maggi:



"An ambassador must have an observant mind, a spirit of application which refuses to be distracted by pleasures or frivolous amusements, a sound judgment which takes the measure of things as they are, and which goes straight to its goal by the shortest and most natural paths without wandering into useless refinements and subtleties which as a rule only succeed in repelling those with whom one is dealing. The negotiator must further possess that penetration which enables him to discover the thoughts of men and to know by the least movement of their countenances what passions are stirring within, for such movements are often betrayed even by the most practiced negotiator. He must also have a mind so fertile in expedients as easily to smooth away the difficulties which he meets in the course of his duty; he must have presence of mind to find a quick and pregnant reply even to unforeseen surprises, and by such judicious replies he must be able to recover himself when his foot has slipped. An equable humour, a tranquil and patient nature, always ready to listen with attention to those whom he meets ; an address always open, genial, civil, agreeable, with easy and ingratiating manners which assist largely in making a favourable impression upon those around him these things are the indispensable adjuncts to the negotiator's profession. Their opposite, the grave and cold air, a melancholy or rough exterior, may create a first impression which is not easily removed. Above all the good negotiator must have sufficient control over himself to resist the longing to speak before he has really thought what he shall say." (Francois de Callieres)

Best,
Saheed

American Empire?

The unending debate on the existence of an American empire is compounded by the use by numerous scholars of the outdated framework of analysis which frequently compares this twentieth century phenomenon with previous empires such as the British and Roman Empires. Whilst there is a requisite to have a point of reference of comparison to define empire, this essay says there is a “new American Empire” and seeks to show that where comparative historiography is the foremost framework of analysis, it weakens the argument of those who say there is no American Empire. Marxists continue to focus on the lack of rivalry between imperial powers and a post-modernistic concept of empire without a centre and none of these allows us to understand the form of imperialism, uniquely embodied in the American State, which has emerged in the contemporary era . However the clarity of distinction between the hub and spoke nature of empire featuring direct and territorial rule and the more contemporary recognizable multilateral approach in acquiring hegemony status cannot be ignored. Nevertheless it is argued that emphasizing the distinction between hegemony and empire as a basis of substantiation that there is no American empire is inadequate. These distinctions, invariably a discourse in the context of anarchy and hierarchy play less significance than is often associated in determining if the American unipolar order is a latter day empire of something new. Finally this essay argues that most debates surrounding empire is narrow and too focused and don’t give equal weighting to features of empire as relating to all dimensions such as Military, Economic and Cultural. If defined broad enough, most scholars would acquiesce to the existence of an American Empire.


The first section introduces the origin of the empire debate and key actors and their arguments. It then looks at various scholarly attempts at definitions of hegemony and empire and the role of power and sovereignty in assessing and theorizing American empire. This is intentionally not a long drawn assessment of the difference between unipolarity, hegemony and empire as some scholars such as Nexus and Thomas have done . That represents only one facet of the framework for analysis. Though a strong framework, in isolation it could be problematic and lead to an inaccurate conclusion of the non-existence of an American Empire. After this is an exploration of the dominant dimensions used as a basis of empirical analysis to ‘measure’ what constitutes an empire – military, economic and cultural. By assessing each of these dimensions with more contemporary events in the period of 9/11 and the second Gulf war in Iraq in 2003 and outlining the combination of arguments that both support and discount the notion of an American empire for each event, it starts to become evident why there might be a growing acquiescent of the existence of an American Empire.

There are essentially two identifiable prominent periods when the debate surrounding the reality of American empire intensified – the end of the cold war and 9/11. The first was what Charles Krauthammer refers to as ‘the Unipolar Moment’ . At this moment the US was in the enviable position of unparalleled military and economic strength and viewed to have also won the ideological war against communism. David Ludden argued Americans are only recently beginning to understand their imperial history which has remained largely invisible. By comparing and contrasting the ‘old days of Imperialism’ before 1945, he concurs that ‘imperialism acquired a new format under American leadership.” It can be said that the cold war, globalization, security and terrorism justified US expansion militarily, economically and politically. Michael Cox said the political order of nation states made the term empire outdated as one country could not legally administer another. If on this basis alone there is no American empire, then there probably cannot be any other empire. Cox’s implication of an outdated definition could suggest an up to date definition where legal administration over another state was not a pre-requisite would make it easier for America to be classified as an empire. This could be one reason Antonio Negri felt the need to write ‘Reflections on Empire’, an ‘update’ on his original work ‘Empire’? The second period of intensified American empire debate was after 9/11 and the run up to the war in Iraq. Intriguingly, Antonio Negri commented that the attacks on New York and Washington did not change the condition of sovereignty but revealed a change that had already taken place – the inadequacy of any substantial notion of sovereignty. Negri states “In our current transition towards Empire, the sovereignty of the dominant nation states is being compromised, while sovereignty is being transformed by, a new imperial power, supranational, tending towards global control.” America comes to mind.

American Hegemony, understood as domination of the unipolar world since the end of the cold war, and the reality of its preponderance on power, military and economic, today is in little doubt. One perspective describes hegemony as the first step on the way to empire. Admittedly, hegemony does not represent an indispensable prerequisite to building empire especially considering the divide and rule characteristic of previous empires. However, Imperial ambition or American ‘neoimperial grand strategy’ , is too strong a temptation to avoid for the dominant power in a unipolar order. John Ikenberry agrees that ‘unipolarity does generate imperial temptations’, but adds using empire alone to describe the political order around American power in inadequate. This in his view is new without historical antecedent. This is the same ‘new imperialism’ however that Michael Mann argued would create more terrorists and rogue states and a less influential America. According to Robert Jervis, “Great power also instills new fears in the dominant state. A hegemon tends to acquire an enormous stake in world order. As power expands, so does a state’s definition of its own interests.” Only where empire exclusively means ‘direct rule over foreign territories without any political representation of their inhabitants’, Niall Ferguson explains, will the distinction between hegemony and empire be correct. Those who say there is no American empire emphasize that the sovereignty of the nation state was pertinent to the imperialism of European states. However, according to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, sovereignty has taken a new global form comprising a combination of national and supranational united under a single logic of rule. This they call Empire. Recognizing this new form of sovereignty changes the terms of the American empire debate. Similarly if the definition is broad enough, America can be considered an empire, and if narrow enough a conclusion reached that it is not one.

Nexon and Wright highlight extensively the problem with scholars attempting to address the American empire debate without focusing on how aspects of imperial dynamics compare to unipolar and hegemonic orders. They argue that ideal-typical empires are different from hegemonic and unipolar orders as they ‘rule through intermediaries’ and ‘heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political communities’. By graphically illustrating numerous relational perspectives between predominant and lesser powers they compare unipolarity, various forms of hegemony and empire. They found the first two relatively straightforward. On empire, despite a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the concept, however, scholars and commentators agree on many characteristics of empires. Most argue that empires are multiethnic polities, that they involve the dominance of one polity over other political communities and that core-periphery relations are an important component. Nexon and Wright note: “By themselves, however, these characteristics fail to distinguish “empires” from “hegemonies.” They also do not, in of themselves, suggest a spare set of structural dynamics. On features of empire most agree with, America is a hegemonic power with ‘neoimperial grand strategy’



Military Dimension: How much has power got to do with it?

There are two conspicuously absent criticisms in the role of military power in the debate surrounding the existence of an American empire. The first is the degree to which the discourse is skewed in favor of citing military as the predominant source of US imperial ambitions. The second is the lack of recognition that the debate goes far beyond the number of air force bases the US has or the fact that defense expenditure is double that of the rest of the top 6 nations combined. In the first case, it is telling that the ‘Project for the new American Century’ pays such little attention in its extensive policy analysis documents to anything other than security and defense from a military perspective. Brooks and Wohlforth are more careful in avoiding this pitfall and highlight that what distinguishes the International system is American dominance in both military and economic categories simultaneously. On the second point that it’s not just about having power, but its impact and how it’s used. Robert Jervis notes in his review of Brooks’ and Wohlforths book , that even though the conclusion that size matters may be incorrect from the standpoint of much of political science, they dispute claims of the proponents of the three leading paradigms in international politics – realism, liberalism and constructivism that the current American predominance in the International System should generate balancing dynamics that should restrain the United States. However it mustn’t be downplayed that if empire is about winning conflicts and agenda setting, a strong military such as the American forces is important.



Economic Dimension: Whose invisible hand?

After a sustained period of ‘empire by denial’, many neoconservatives are now talking with pride of a “new American empire” which has a new face hiding behind the dominant military and political power. This face of international economic rules and rule making organizations help a hegemon apply its power. Though not necessarily always applicable it is necessary to state the obvious that economic preponderance precedes military power. It does for America and according to Robert Wade, this is America’s invisible hand. Michael Mann has a different metaphor in his arguments suggesting a drive towards imperial incoherence resulting from uneven power resources: a ‘military giant’ and ‘Back-seat economic driver’. Economists like numbers and so presumably Empire economists like big numbers because it represents power. Having $13 billion in GDP representing more than a quarter of the worlds GDP, the US numbers are impressive. Not enough to impress Mann. Even though he admits these are ‘substantial imperial powers’, he insists the US is only a Back-seat driver being unable to directly control foreign investors or economies and limited powers over big economies like Russia, India and China. His assessment of how much control the America really has starts by looking at the carrot and stick approach in this dimension – sanctions and development aid respectively. For the former to be effective requires international organization. For the latter to be a force for global development, it just isn’t enough. Mann uses the word ‘puny’. The failure of US carrots and sticks to win a majority in the UN Security Council over the invasion of Iraq could be cited as evidence of this. However could this really be an argument that the US has limited influence economically as required by an empire? Mann actually contradicts his argument when he suggests that many promises of aid made by the US at the time of the UN vote over Iraq in 1991 were not upheld and this led to distrust of the US to fulfill its pledges. He continued his analogy by saying “This back-seat driver will not pay for the gas. It is difficult to build an Empire without spending money.” This actually weakens the argument of the potential influence of carrots and sticks and points more to a failure of implementing policy. It could be safely assumed that if the US did fulfill all its pledges in 1991, which it had the resources to do, its influence could have been capitalized on in 2003.

The financial and economic meltdown in 2008 has transformed whispers of doubts of American Hegemony into more audible voices. This has brought back into the limelight the question of the benefits and logic of neoliberalism and free trade. This however only lends itself to the debate about the decline of American empire and not as much about its existence. It is paradoxical to talk about the decline of something that doesn’t exist. The US has numerous economic challenges such as a large trade deficit, the growing influence of the European Union as a region of economic influence and the Euro’s growing popularity even though the Dollar’s reserves globally are still huge and the City of London’s rise as a global financial centre. Can any of these be conclusively cited as evidence that there has never been an American Empire and undermine its global influence?



Cultural Dimension: Liberalism or Empire?

Many scholars still find value in comparing America with European Imperial Powers to identify similarities, but more importantly, differences. One distinction is qualitative. The goal and desire of power dominance are the same but the approach to achieving this differs. The importance of ‘soft power’ in America’s foreign policy has had no stronger advocate than Joseph Nye, who says “it comes from being a shining city upon a hill.” Winning conflicts, agenda setting and shaping normality are characteristics of imperialism. According to Nye: “Winning the peace is harder than winning a war, and soft power is essential to winning the peace.” Upon further analysis, the attraction of the American way of life as a magnet or even as missionary is not far removed from the British. The British Empire also actively sought to make its values attractive to others and to spread Christianity. Ferguson explains in a historical context how administrators applied their notions of law and order and the noticeable impact of the use of the BBC in the 1930s is viewed as more than the soft power of the United States today. In the more recent events of 9/11 leading up to the war on Iraq, President Bush’s West Point address evokes American values and speaks of a fight for a just ‘peace that favors human liberty’. Whilst the speech reminded graduates of ‘the challenge of imperial communism’ – Korea to Berlin, to Vietnam, and in the Cold War from beginning to end, the US does face two ‘logics of order’. Ikenberry cites an order based around liberalism and one around imperialism, the former with prominent features of the post-1945 Western system and the latter around unilateralism, divide and rule strategies and coercive domination. Edward Rhodes talks about these two logics of order and combines them to describe ‘The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda’ arguing that America’s return to Wilsonian Internationalism doesn’t mean that a liberal order based on human liberty and consent, will not require the exercise of power. America has demonstrated in numerous instances little hesitation in exercising this power. Power here, military or otherwise could be interpreted to be the hegemonic characteristic of an empire. This speech reflects a slight contradiction though. On the one hand it serves as a proponent to the power of an idea - in this case, American Exceptionalism, and hence the propensity to aspire to win conflicts, set the agenda and shape normality. On the other hand however, the speech fails in its attempt to disguise its imperial nature. By emphasizing ‘imperial communism’ as what America has confronted diplomatically, economically, militarily and the victory of ‘moral clarity’, President Bush almost illustrates the proverbial fingers pointing back at you when you point one finger at someone else. There is almost the subliminal admission of the existence of the opposite of imperial communism - imperial liberalism.

Jean Bricmont talks about using Human Rights to sell war and explains that since the end of the Cold War, the idea of human rights has been made into a justification for intervention by the world's leading economic and military powers—above all, the United States—in countries that are vulnerable to their attacks. The criteria for such intervention have become more arbitrary and self-serving, and their form more destructive, from Yugoslavia to Afghanistan to Iraq. Until the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the large parts of the left was often complicit in this ideology of intervention-discovering new “Hitlers” as the need arose, and denouncing antiwar arguments as appeasement on the model of Munich in 1938. This ‘Humanitarian Imperialism’ can be argued represents the character of the new American empire. Noam Chomsky agrees describing this as “the new doctrine of Imperial Right” and notes how this was unhampered by superpower rivalry. America hasn’t shied away from playing a leading imperial type role in this growing norm of Humanitarian Intervention in corners of the globe as far flung as Somalia or Sudan.



Conclusion

The prevalent framework for the discourse and debate on the existence of an American empire is at best inadequate and at worst flawed. It focuses too much on the thin line between the definition of what constitutes a hegemonic power and an empire. By attempting to compare formal and informal empire such as the British and Roman empires with this ‘new American empire’ is fraught with problematic analysis if it ignores the changing political landscape. By limiting the features of empire to military power or having the argument weighted favorably in that context further compounds this. It demonstrates that if the characteristics and features for inclusion into what constitutes an empire is wide enough the conclusion of the existence of an American empire is invariably reached. Conversely, if narrow enough, there is no American empire. Proponents and Opponents alike customarily meander towards a definition to the extent to which substantiates their claim. However the impact and not just the existence of all sources and dimensions of hegemonic power – military, economic and cultural – are considered, more boxes than not are ticked and the argument for the existence of an American empire is more plausible. Evidence for this can be found in contemporary events such as 9/11 and the war on terror. Here’s a final thought – The unprecedented interest from all corners of the globe in the recent US presidential elections in November 2008, conjures up images, not that far removed from Roman times, of subjects from all over the world eager to know who the next emperor would be.



 

Bibliography

Bricmont, J. (2006). Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War. (D. Johnstone, Trans.) New York: Monthly Review Press.



Brooks, S. G., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2002). American Primacy in Perspective. Foreign Affairs , 81 (4), 20-33.



Brooks, S. G., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2008). World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.



Chomsky, N. (2008). Humaitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right. Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine , 60 (4), 22-50.



Ferguson, N. (2004). Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire. London: Allen Lane.



Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.



Ikenberry, J. G. (2002). America's Imperial Ambition - The Lures of Pre-emption. Foreign Affairs , 81 (5), 44-60.



Ikenberry, J. G. (2004). Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age. Review of International Studies , 30 (4), 609-630.



Jervis, R. (2003). The Compulsive Empire. Foreign Policy (137), 83-87.



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Did decolonization mark a major change in World Politics?

This essay seeks to show that decolonization was instrumental to major changes in world politics. Even though a plethora of changes, positive and negative, minor and major can be attributed to decolonization, it is recognized that the liberal definition of what constitutes a major change, particularly self-determination and the constructivist perspective of values, identity, ideas and wide reaching normative change, differs from the realist perspective that a major change constitutes a shift in the balance of power. The limitations of this realist perspective are addressed. Self-determination and sovereignty of prior colonies in Asia and Africa are presented as symbolically important divergent from the realist suggestion that the actual exercising of sovereignty by weaker or ‘quasi’ states is of minimal impact in world politics. It is also presented here that contemporary events in world politics, such as the growing norm of human intervention and its apparent infringement on sovereignty has some of its origins traced back to decolonization. The liberal position that central to impact of decolonization on world politics was the changing and growing role of international institutions, is argued to be congruent with the constructivist view that the meanings and interpretations are significant.


This assessment starts by firstly contrasting the contending paradigms of theoretical framework of realism, liberalism and constructivism, their understanding of decolonization, the international system, sovereignty and what constitutes a major change in world politics. There is analysis of transformations and continuities in world politics and the ‘expansion of the international society’ , prior to and after decolonization to identify when, where, why and how they can be attributed to decolonization. Understanding changes in the post colonial relationship is indispensable to this assessment and brief references are made to the Commonwealth and Francophone states. An appraisal is made of the impact of changing composition of International Institutions notably the United Nations, the impact of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). The impact of decolonization in India on contemporary world politics is evaluated and a brief conclusion summarizes key findings.



Understanding Decolonization - What does each theoretical framework say?

According to Duara: “… decolonization refers to the process whereby colonial powers transferred institutional and legal control over their territories and dependencies to indigenously based, formally sovereign, nation-states … decolonization represented not only the transference of legal sovereignty, but a movement for moral justice and political solidarity against imperialism.” (Duara, 2004).

It isn’t uncommon for liberal accounts of decolonization to use a chronology that begins with the signing of The Charter of the United Nations in 1945 followed by a growing tide of nationalism in Africa and Asia. There were provisions in the charter supporting normative ideas and values of equal rights and self determination of all peoples. According to Paul Lauren, for nationalist leaders in Africa and Asia, this provision “bolstered their spirits further” (Lauren, 1988). This gave impetus to normative framework change of human rights and self-determination that made imperialism unfashionable and independence inevitable. Robert Jackson notes: “Demands for independence based on equality and self-determination eventually deprived colonialism of its moral defenses and put in its place alternative norms for justifying independent statehood” (Jackson, 1993).

Realists pay a lot less attention to normative notions in world politics. In trying to comprehend the impact of decolonization, they focus on its effect on power and the security interests of states. They may make reference to growing military and humanitarian intervention as evidence that decolonization did not give absolute sovereignty to newly independent states. Stephen Krasner asks pertinent questions that both liberals and realists ask themselves. “What do Third World countries want? How can they get it? What should the North do? What is the long term prognosis for North-South relations?” (Krasner S. D., 1985). Realists answer these questions with power, control and politics as the backdrop whilst liberals accentuate self-determination, normative change, economics and the role of institutions. Realists attribute the motivations of the developing nations for pursuing decolonization to a desire to maximize power for the state arguing that the demands of the G77 for the NIEO and altering the composition of existing international institutions confirms this. This can be further substantiated as newly independent states consistently exercise their sovereignty, which in many cases leads to human rights abuses on their own citizens. Liberals are in favor of institutions that promote this sovereign right. However, the realist will further say this is ‘organized hypocrisy’ and sovereignty is irrelevant without the power to back it up and are likely to make reference to the limited impact of the NIEO as evidence of this.

A widespread approach to analysis of change in world politics as a result of decolonization is looking at post colonial relationships and its impact on foreign policy. ”Most constructivist work on post-imperial ties, however, has focused on autonomous change in the normative framework of North-South relations (for instance, on decolonization …)” (Brysk, Parsons, & Sandholtz, 2002). Ideas, values and identity are recognized by the constructivist school as the catalyst for normative change during the decolonization process. The idea of granting sovereignty is a social construct from interaction and sharing of ideas.



Decolonization Transformations: What constitutes a major change in world politics?

According to neo-realists, “States dominate the transnational arena although the constitution of this arena is changing.” (Heller & Sofaer, 2001). Consequently changes in statehood and sovereignty can be considered major in global politics. According to Brown, the term ‘sovereignty’ refers to claims of autonomy of multiple political units, a distinguishing feature of international political theory (Brown, 2002). Sovereignty and Self determination are central as key drivers of decolonization and represent the significant desired and achieved changes to newly independent states in Asia and Africa. Hedley Bull cites five themes or phases in their “revolt against the west” namely the struggles for equal sovereignty, formal political independence, racial equality, economic justice and cultural liberation (Bull, 1984). This ‘revolt’ represented the start of a seismic shift in the universal international society dominated by European powers – economical, military, intellectual and cultural authority and institutional legality. Bull goes on to further highlight factors he believes represent what brought about the collapse of the old Western-dominated international order. A number of these were interwoven in the decolonization process and closely associated with a liberal view of normative change. There was the “psychological and spiritual awakening” of colonised peoples which led them to become more active in political affairs, the West gradually losing interest in maintaining the position of dominance, the rise of the Soviet Union and shifting power equilibrium. Pertinently the Afro-Asian movement, G77, and Non Aligned Movement efforts transformed the moral climate of the international order.

The motivation for decolonization to reduce Western dominance is commonly discussed in the name of ideas and values by constructivists even when these values are ‘western’. Stephen Krasner offers an alternative realist perspective by the assumption that “... Third World states like all states in the international system are concerned about vulnerability and threat ...” (Krasner S. D., 1985). The motivation for decolonization is as much for power and control as it is for wealth. The Asian and African nations desired more than anything control over international regimes so they could secure their interests and values.

From the Liberal perspective, even though after decolonization these nations remained dependent to varying degrees on their previous colonisers for their security their motivation and behaviour was as a result of state preferences, not capability. Liberal Institutionalism acquiesces that more representation in the UN was an effective vehicle to pursue these interests. The advantage was growing acknowledgement of the principle of sovereign equality of states, an area that constituted a change in world politics from a power and control perspective. According to Krasner “... Before the twentieth century ... great-power dominated sovereign equality ... In the present system, the principle of sovereign equality dominates that of great-power primacy” (Krasner S. D., 1985). The classical realist might downplay the importance of participation and institutionalism and propose that increased Afro-Asian vote and involvement in the United Nation did not represent a major change in world politics. Even where there might be a slight shift in the balance of power, the view is that the International society will always include strong states and weak states, real states and ‘quasi’ states possessing positive and negative sovereignty respectively. If world politics represents interaction between sovereign states, then the mere rise in the number of states sovereignty, regardless of its ‘hypocrisy’, determines a major change. The sheer increase in diplomatic activity within the United Nations demonstrates evolution of the international order, challenging the realist argument that it represents only a stage for the main actors to exercise their power.

Another limitation of the realist perspective in determining changes in world politics attributed to decolonization is in its primary premise that the main actors on the world stage are states. Assuming other actors such as multinational corporations, international organizations and rising number of non-governmental organisations all have to work within the framework of the state actually doesn’t address the phrase ‘world politics’ . A large number of states became legally sovereign as a result of decolonization, but in practise they have to interact and negotiate with all sorts of other actors and the freedom to act as they desire embodied in the right to self-determination is restricted. This re-enforces the liberal view of interdependence being important in world politics and the growing nature of this due to changing norms introducing new actors (for example international organizations promoting human rights) has been effected by decolonization.

Another relatable challenge could be to the realist notion that sovereignty is absolute. There is increasing concern in the global political landscape for human security, higher levels of human intervention and the dilution of the importance of sovereignty in such cases. Decolonization contributed to a proliferation of ‘failed’ states resulting from inability for effective self-rule and dependence on former colonial powers for economic aid and security. Christopher Clapham notes that the French readiness to intervene militarily in Africa in the post colonial period included operations in Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad, Togo, Zaire and Western Sahara. Somewhat recent is Rwanda, where there was French direct military support for the regime in power. It could be argued by the constructivists’ school that growing civil war in newly independent African states influenced a changing norm of Human Intervention as ‘illegal but morally legitimate’. This norm of a higher moral cause as being important even where it infringes on a states’ sovereignty has spread and impacted world politics. In the last two decades we can see instances of this in Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq and Darfur in Sudan. The growing use of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) language has been significant in international politics today and central to drafting of international law and various resolutions passed in the UN. Recognizing that decolonization contributed to the creation of these ‘failed’ states and served as a trigger to these events cannot be ignored as an impact on world politics.

Decolonization Transformations: When, where and how has this happened?

By the 1960s, after years of fighting for independence, most Western colonial territories had gained self-rule. The change in world politics was the newly independent nations’ quest to realize their identity in the international arena. According to the constructivist school, world politics is essentially determined by shared meanings, norms and ideas (Wendt, 1999). This was clearly demonstrated in what became the most symbolic and influential moment at attempts at decolonization – the famous Asian-African Conference at Bandung in Indonesia. The strong shared values of resistance to colonial domination, discrimination against race and rights to self determination served as the prelude to what Paul Lauren referred to as “the flood” where in just over a decade, the membership of the United Nations more than doubled eventually giving Afro-Asians a majority. This represented a major shift in world politics as they could now influence the agenda on a wide variety of subjects ranging from human rights and sovereignty to racial discrimination. The reverberation of this heightened level of consciousness and mounting international pressure was felt across the globe - politically, socially and culturally. There were implications for Canadian Immigration Bill of 1965, the British parliament passing the Race Relations, dismantling of apartheid in South Africa and Civil rights movement in the US. In the UN, numerous historic treaties and agreements were passed – UNESCO approved the 1962 Convention against Discrimination in Education, the notable 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Decolonization Continuities: What is perceived as unchanged?

Sovereignty, classical realists note, did not bring with it complete freedom from imperialist influences. Colonial legacies were visible in the desire of the new governments to keep the boundaries that were created during colonial times, in the promotion of ethnic rivalry, in the continuation of inhumane and unjust actions against minority populations, and in the practice of distributing the country's resources in an uneven manner. Also, after being under foreign rule for decades, newly independent governments often lacked governmental institutions, good governance skills, and the governing experience needed to effectively rule their newly sovereign nations. In most cases, the transition from colonial province to independent state was a violent and arduous journey.

The ‘morning after’ decolonization was a traumatic experience for a number of newly independent states as the “relationship with the former colonial power was the only substantial external relationship ...” (Clapham, 1996). In Africa the former metro pole continued to have extensive interests within the African state. This ‘new’ relationship was one in which the African State had least control. According to William Zartman, this ‘dependency approach’ (in contrast to decolonization theory, where the relationships are caught up in an evolutionary process) is used to explain Third world developmental problems. In his article written fifteen years after most of Africa received its independence, he notes that Europe is still present and influential in the continent. Despite sovereignty and self-determination, this didn’t seem to represent a change in the international system. Zartman says: “... the attainment of political sovereignty masks the reality of continued dependence on world economic structures, and calculations of power and interest within this dependency relationship explain underdevelopment”. (Zartman, Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency?, 1976). Zartmans realist view that decolonization has not changed much due to continued dependence is analogous to Nkrumahs term Neo-Colonialism as ‘the last stage of Imperialism’. According to Nkrumah “The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is in theory independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.” (Nkrumah, 1965). The limitation with this generalisation is it doesn’t give much credence to the fact that any control is always indirect and it is the independent sovereign state that has direct control.

The unchanged structure of the United Nations Security Council and the permanent five members with veto power is often cited by realists as substantiation of decolonization being inconsequential. This assessment defines power from a limited perspective of primarily military and secondarily economic. There are a large number of newly independent states that are members of the UN, even though not one of the Permanent five members, but wield an enormous amount of ‘soft power’ . India is a good example. Since attaining independence in 1947, it is now recognized as one of the ‘rising’ powers alongside China and Brazil. Alongside its growing economic and military strength and capabilities, its unique strong nationalism and constructivist norm of identity, evident during and ever since the decolonization process, has been significant in defining a strong state in world politics.

The impact of decolonization in India on world politics: A brief case in point

North East and South Asia are regions in which powerful states in the contemporary world have extensive interests and therefore are central to world politics. These regions combined are home to nearly two-fifths of the world population. India’s location and demographics makes it geopolitically strategic to numerous contemporary issues such as nuclear proliferation, global economic crisis, climate change and the fight against terrorism. Decolonization and assertion of its sovereignty has eventually given India, leader of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), a prominent position in world affairs. India’s role in Afghanistan and Pakistan is pivotal and in an increasingly unipolar world with an arguably declining power of previous colonizers like Britain and France, its relationship with the US hegemony is acquiescent and improving. In 2006, the US and Indian governments struck a bilateral deal that recognizes India as a nuclear weapons power and Washington recognizes that in time India could become a valuable security partner. According to Ashton Carter , the deal’s impact would mostly be felt by the ‘in-betweens’ and the ‘stalwarts’ including the five states that are formally entitled to have nuclear weapons under the NPT (Carter, 2006). Even the classical realist looking from a purely power and security perspective would be slightly naive to suggest the impact of this on world politics is minimal.



Conclusion

What has been shown that all theoretical frameworks acquiesce that numerous changes in world politics can be attributed, as least in part to decolonization. Where there is some divergence is what represents major change and the importance of sovereignty. It’s been illustrated that realist explanations of decolonization transformations that focus on self-interested states competing for power or security, using economic and military instruments, is limited if it does not account for normative change. The constructivist view of collective norms and social identities in the Afro-Asian caucus of the UN and activities of the Non-Aligned Movement shaping elite beliefs and subsequent state behavior is congruent with the liberal stance that economic and political considerations are important, propagated by instruments such as more representative membership of international institutions. Whilst sovereignty was important motivation for decolonization, its’ symbolic value was of more essence for normative change and quasi states exercising their sovereignty impact was constricted. Finally the brief case study of India has demonstrated that nationalism and subsequent decolonization has enabled the state to evolve into a strategic player in world politics. The essence of the argument is this essay can be encapsulated in the words of British Prime minister, Harold Macmillan, in a speech to both houses of the South African parliament in February 1960: “The wind of change is blowing through this continent and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.” (Harold Macmillan, 3 February 1960, in (Hyam & Louis, 2000))

 

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The Advantages and Disadvantages of Pursuing a Multilateral Approach to negotiations designed to get North Korea to abandon efforts to develop Nuclear Weapons

This essay seeks to show that whilst there are numerous advantages in a multilateral approach to get the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK) to acquiesce to abandon its efforts to develop nuclear weapons, diplomatic momentum is mainly achieved in negotiations mostly where there is an effective bilateral approach. It is argued that a successful negotiation must focus on bilateral diplomacy and this initiates and supports multilateral negotiations. It is suggested that bilateral negotiations should preempt multilateral structures and as such the concept of ‘multi-bilateral’ negotiations provide the best platform and foundation for lasting success. It becomes evident that it is possible to continuously take advantage of the benefits of a multilateral approach based on the bilateral process used. It is argued that as long as bilateral negotiations are done with an overriding multilateral framework with adequate reporting and transparency, the perceived pitfalls, such as conflicting interests and legitimacy, can be mitigated. The question of the effectiveness of sanctions when applied either multilaterally or bilaterally is addressed. The position adopted is “Thinking Multilaterally but Acting Bilaterally” which has been suggested as the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) way (Acharya, 1999).


After clarifying the context in which the term ‘multilateral’ is used, a brief outline illustrates the common debates surrounding the advantages and disadvantages of multilateral negotiation. An assessment of how this has played out in the DPRK is discussed from primarily two perspectives, the period in the run up to the first nuclear crisis (1980 – 1992) culminating in a bilateral agreed framework between the DPRK and the US in 1994 and the first few years of this century including an assessment of the six party talks . Before concluding there is a brief appraisal of the current situation and suggestions as to how the current US administration of President Barack Obama might proceed based on the argument presented here.

What is Multilateral Diplomacy?

Multilateral diplomacy is defined as the management of international relations by negotiations among three or more states through diplomatic or governmental representatives without the services of a specialized secretariat (Boisard & Chossudovsky, 1997). ‘Multilateralism’ in the context of collective security, power or military intervention is slightly different than when used in the context of diplomatic negotiations. The latter is more relevant here. The rise of multilateral diplomacy has been made analogous to the rise in conferences where communication is conducted primarily by means of verbal face-to-face exchanges rather than in the traditional predominantly written style of bilateral diplomacy (Berridge, 2005). According to Ikenberry (2003), “Multilaterism involves the coordination of relations among three or more states according to a set of rules or principles … can be contrasted with interactions based on ad hoc bargaining or straightforward power politics …” (Ikenberry, 2003).

Why is multilateral diplomacy sometimes perceived as the right approach in North Korea?

In assessing negotiation approaches for ‘global problems’ such as nuclear proliferation, it is convenient to assume the liberalist stance of multilateral diplomacy. The commonly cited indispensable element of any negotiation would be to involve all parties with interests, implicit or explicit. Multilateralism has been encouraged by the strain in liberal thought which places emphasis on the importance of popular consent in sustaining government authority (Berridge, 2005). Apart from not being able to reach a mutually acceptable solution, doing otherwise could result in the loss of any symbolical value of consensus and credibility which are intrinsic in providing momentum for negotiations.

The proponents of multilateral diplomacy say that following the rise and growing influence of non state actors and NGOs in international politics, a predominantly bilateral approach for negotiations on nuclear proliferation would reduce their involvement. “Further complexity is added when attention is focused at the sub-state or transnational actor level as the motivations for of non-state actors are different from those associated with states” (Howlett, 2008). This however seems less relevant in North Korea.

A plethora of other reasons exist why multilateral diplomacy such as the six-party talks seems to make sense. Instruments of diplomacy such as economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure are thought to be weaker unless applied multilaterally. There is also the likelihood that a number of bilateral negotiations, where there are conflicting goals or methods, can derail an ongoing multilateral diplomatic effort. In addition, assuming the perspective of liberalism or political idealism that North Korea is a rational actor, consensus achieved in a multilateral framework could put enormous pressure for eventual compliance.

Why is it better to “Think Multilateral but act Bilateral”?

Despite the advantages of a multilateral approach presented thus far, bilateral strategies are more efficient and focused since there are fewer parties involved and therefore less coordination issues. It is easier to have more clarity of interests. Momentum can be maintained and agreements kept for longer periods as there are less exit options, collective action is at a minimum and it is less cumbersome to monitor compliance. The efficiency here provides additional flexibility in being able to deal with stumbling blocks or potential show stoppers as they are evident more quickly. The ability to act and have quicker agreements mitigates the likelihood of missing a “window of opportunity” which exists for solving each problem. It is unlikely that these opportunities will occur simultaneously in a multilateral context (Heppell, 1997). Bilateral diplomacy also addresses distinct differences in history, culture , force structure, domestic politics, intraregional animosities and economic development which are often lost in a complex multilateral framework especially where parties might be from different regions. This could explain the suggestion that transferring the structures of a multilateral framework such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would be ineffective in the Asia Pacific region (Heppell, 1997).

There are some examples of bilateral negotiations that have been criticized. The US’ attempts to persuade North Korea to join the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (hereafter NPT) in the 1980s, the DPRK’s and South Korea’s attempted implementation of their bilateral 1991 agreement to limit nuclear activities not in the NPT and the US and North Korea’s Agreed Framework in 1994. Its proponents have suggested that even though its future is uncertain, the six party talks was a multilateral strategy that gave impetus to negotiations. Notwithstanding, the 1994 Agreed Framework combined with The DPRK’s ascension to the NPT contributed in no small way to freezing plutonium production for nearly a decade. What was missing during this period was a series of other bilateral negotiations between other parties with interests. Pertinent also was China’s unwillingness during this period to use its influence to persuade North Korea to comply with IAEA inspections(Park, 2005). “To critics, the Agreed Framework undermined the NPT regime because it allowed North Korea to remain in violation of its safeguards obligations … To its supporters, the Agreed Framework accepted a delay in the North Korea’s compliance with safeguards in exchange for achieving a freeze on North Korea’s plutonium program which, if left hindered, could have produced much larger quantities of plutonium … “(Chipman, 2004). The framework agreement also bought time. Ted Carpenter notes that a 1999 report by the Clinton administration stated that without the freeze the agreement brought, North Korea could have produced 50 nuclear weapons in the intervening years. That they did not do so “is a solid achievement.”(Carpenter & Bandow, 2004)

Are sanctions less effective when applied bilaterally?

North Korea is under intense strain internally politically and economically. It has progressively got weaker despite recent attempts at economic reform . In general debates about sanctions, the impression is that they are weak and ineffective unless applied multilaterally. For North Korea however there are a number of reasons why this impression may be flawed.

There is one dominant nation with considerable influence on North Korea – China. North Korea depends on China for the bare necessities to keep it afloat i.e. food, energy and medicines. According to Shen (2009), “China is expected to play a significant role in changing North Korea’s nuclear course due to the economic bond between Beijing and Pyongyang, as well as their traditional bilateral defense ties” (Shen, 2009). Where a country has one significant trading partner, what becomes pertinent is the exploitation of the bilateral relationship in an effort to get North Korea to be less belligerent. One repeatedly cited example where this was used to great effect was in 2003 when China cut off oil supply for three days in a thinly veiled threat, citing ‘technical problems’ as the reason. The DPRK got the message and this tool altered its position toward the Three-Party Talks instigated by China in the lead up to the Six-Party talks. (Shen, 2009).

Consensus is often exceptionally difficult to reach in a multilateral forum. The debates range from how long sanctions should last for, how stringent they should be and what should form part of the sanctions. Heppell (1997) illustrates this in a section on ‘Factors promoting and preventing multilateral consensus on sanctions’. She lists all the reasons for supporting or opposing sanctions respectively for each of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US (Heppell, 1997). This outline shows how diverse the reasons for support or lack of support of sanctions are. Even where there is a consensus, when reasons for support are based on conflicting interests, it could end up being counter-productive.

Is the assumption that only sanctions or diplomatic pressure applied from as many sources as possible lead to compliance correct? The liberalist supposition that North Korea is a rational actor and behaves as such seems to lack the depth of analysis needed to assess how the DPRK has responded similarly in the past and circumstances that might make it act unpredictably. In 1993, sudden additional pressure from the US, Russia and China, caused the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT, which was the opposite of the desired effect (Chipman, 2004).

How could timing, transparency and reporting mitigate perceived drawbacks of Bilateral Negotiations?

Chipman (2004) additionally notes that following North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, “The US decided to engage in direct talks with North Korea, calculating that diplomatic pressure and the threat of sanctions wouldn’t be sufficient to disarm Pyongyang. Moreover, key players like China, Russia, South Korea and Japan made it clear they would not support tougher measures unless Washington first tried to resolve the issue through dialogue with Pyongyang”(Chipman, 2004). This highlights that timing and intuitive scheduling starting with a focus of bilateral negotiations in a multilateral context is significant.

Reiss (2006-07) cites a number of possible drawbacks of separate bilateral negotiations, especially where conflicting methods and goals are involved (Reiss, 2006-07). There is potentially a feeling of being ‘left out’, isolation and even resentment if there is any mistrust that your interests are not being bolstered in bilateral talks you are not directly involved in. One conundrum the US faces at the moment is the inevitable pressure from China and Russia it expects to face as a result of any bilateral talks directly with North Korea. This occurred previously in the run up to the 1994 Agreed Framework when South Korea and Japan expressed dissatisfaction at their positions being negotiated by the US. This drawback is significantly mitigated if these formed part of a larger multilateral framework where all interested and affected parties are aware they would get their own say at the table. It does mean however for example, if the six-party talks were organized in separate bilateral meetings there would need to be a total of 15 separate negotiations taking place. Despite its perceived complexity, this is essential to assuage stalling and if strategically timed and scheduled, maintains diplomatic momentum. This structure allows maximizing “windows of opportunity” as they arise and a series of quick wins add up to visible progress.

The reality is that multilateral negotiations are more complex. According to Aviel (2005), “Multilateral negotiation is characterized by multi-parties, multi-issues, multi-roles, and multi-values. The level of complexity is far greater in a multilateral conference than in bilateral diplomacy, as is the level of skill needed to manage that complexity” (Aviel, 2005). The exact nature of administering the larger multilateral framework, the what, how, when and who, is therefore crucial.

According to Reiss (2006-07), “Bilateral talks make it easier for Pyongyang to pit the allies against the US”. Despite this he goes on to conclude “None of these arguments is reason enough for the United States not to negotiate directly with North Korea …” (Reiss, 2006-07).

An example where conflicting bilateral goals and methods have been an impediment is in North Korea and South Korea talks running alongside North Korea and US talks. Whilst South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun wants to improve economic relations with counterparts in the North via his “Peace and Prosperity Policy”, Washington has tried to force North Korea to abandon its efforts to develop nuclear weapons through economic pressure. John S. Parks cites ‘Unveiling Divergences’ by looking at what priority the key players have for each of the key issues namely Nuclear Proliferation, Refugees, Ballistic Missiles and Korean Re-unification with interesting results. He mentions this conflicting bilateral diplomatic negotiation and economic policy when he discusses South Korea (Park, 2005).

It is argued that conducting these separate negotiations, with openness and adequate reporting, at different times in a previously agreed sequence as part of a multilateral framework, would have alleviated the chance of a fall out from conflicting goals and methods. Reporting formed a key component of the success of bilateral talks during US and North Korea negotiations that lead to the signing of the 1994 Framework agreement. China, South Korea and Japan were regularly being updated on progress made and numerous meetings between high ranking officials ensured conflicting interests did not stall the process. One added benefit of efficient reporting and transparency is that it significantly reduces constructivists’ perspective that multilateral agreements are the only form of negotiated agreements that bring legitimacy.

How could this approach be used to address the current crisis in North Korea?

North Korea has tested two nuclear weapons in 2009 and left a conundrum in the laps of the Obama administration. Following North Korea’s exit from the six-party framework and its uncertain pessimistic future, Niksch (2009) has suggested an approach similar to this essay’s argument, that is bilateral talks in a multilateral framework – and he also seeks to start to answer the previous question of the administration of the larger multilateral framework. He says “… offer North Korea bilateral negotiations with the United States outside of the six party framework. This likely would mean the end of the six party talks as an actual forum for negotiations, although it might continue as a nominal institution to ratify any final US-North Korean denuclearization agreement” (Niksch, 2009)

Very recently, North Korea has signaled its willingness to resume talks. In a tone comparable with this essay’s argument that bilateral discussions must pre-empt any multilateral talks, the North Korean leadership has indicated they would consider talks with China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and US in six-party talks, provided it had direct talks with Washington . The suggested way forward could be a series of bilateral meetings very similar to how in 2003 China institutionalized previous trilateral negotiations with a three stage hypothetical road map, when they hosted the first round of the six party talks. “The road map was also intended to provide an example of how structured multilateral negotiations can enable the parties to move beyond the nuclear deadlock” (Park, 2005). The use of the term ‘structured multilateral’ in essence corresponds to a series of bilateral negotiations in a multilateral scheduled framework or ‘multi-bilateral’ as mentioned earlier.

For almost 5 years, under the last US Republican administration of George W. Bush, the ‘hawks’ pursued a policy of multilateral negotiation through the six-party talks with a combination of diplomatic and economic pressure. The successes of this approach, which directly opposes the North Korean regimes consistent request for bilateral talks, have been limited. According to Reiss (2006-07), “Three years of Six-Party Talks have yielded little … the strategic positions of the other parties continue to erode” (Reiss, 2006-07). Supporters of direct bilateral negotiation argue that “… although the United States has limited coercive measures remaining, it has ample positive leverage for pushing forward on an agreement with North Korea … the multilateral coalition will be stronger if the United States tries a bilateral approach first, indicating its good faith to other parties” (Chanlett-Avery & Squassoni, 2006). With this model in mind, it could be suggested that a good start is for US, China and North Korea to engage in bilateral and trilateral talks initially. President Obama’s recent visit to Asia, particularly China is arguably the first step. The North Korea issue is at the heart of the Sinio-American relationship, which is a bilateral relationship that remains the key driver for any form of multilateral negotiations.



Conclusion

A combination of bilateral and multilateral negotiation strategies is the essence of progress in North Korea. The focus however must be on bilateral negotiations that pre-empt a framework that suggests “Thinking multilaterally, but acting bilaterally”. This reduces the impact of perceived weaknesses of bilateral approach such as less effective sanctions and conflicting goals and methods. The discussion around the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions, has suggested that as long as sanctions applied bilaterally are consistent and by a major trading partner, such as China in the case of North Korea, they will be as effective. As long as the overriding multilateral framework has transparency and is cloaked by efficient reporting , no issues of isolation, belligerence or lack of consensus would arise. This then leaves room to take advantage of the efficiency and focus of bilateral negotiations which has long been the demand and motivation of the North Korean regime. Lastly, following the recent nuclear tests this year, it is believed that President Obama’s recent trip to Asia is congruent with the main thesis of this essay and serves to be the first step bilaterally to be followed by subsequent bilateral negotiations before a wider multilateral framework.





Bibliography

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• Aviel, J. F. (2005). The Evolution of Multillateral Diplomacy. In J. P. Muldoon Jr., J. F. Aviel, R. Reitano, & E. Sullivan, Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations today (p. 19). Cambridge, Mass: Westview Press.

• Berridge, G. R. (2005). Diplomacy Theory and Practice. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

• Boisard, M. A., & Chossudovsky, E. (1997). Multilateral Diplomacy: United Nations System at Geneva - A Working Guide. Brill.

• Carpenter, T. G., & Bandow, D. (2004). The Korean Conundrum - America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

• Chanlett-Avery, E., & Squassoni, S. (2006). North Korea's Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options. Congressional Research Service.

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• Heppell, J. M. (1997). Confidence-Building Measures: Bilateral versus Multilateral Approaches. In Y. W. Kihl, & P. Hayes, Peace and Security in Northeast Asia - The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula (p. 270). Armonk, New York: M E Sharpe.

• Howlett, D. (2008). Nuclear Proliferation. In J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P. Owens, The Globalization of World Politics (p. 393). New York: Oxford University Press Inc.

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• Niksch, L. A. (2009). North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy. CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service.

• Park, J. S. (2005, Autumn). Inside Multilaterism: The Six-Party Talks. The Washington Quarterly , 28 (4), pp. 76-87.

• Reiss, M. B. (2006-07). A Nuclear-armed North Korea: Accepting the 'Unacceptable'? Survival , 48 (4), 102-103.

• Shen, D. (2009, October). Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea. The Washington Quarterly , p. 177.

The Three Musketeers and Collective Security

One for all, and all for one (latin: un pour tous, tous pour un; also inverted to All for one, and one for all) is a motto traditionally associated with the titular heroes of the novel The Three Musketeers written by Alexandre Dumas, père, first published in 1844. In the novel, it was the motto of a group of French musketeers named Athos, Porthos, Aramis and d'Artagnan who stayed loyal to each other through thick and thin.


This is essentially what collective security in International Relations is all about. When a number of nations get together under the umbrella of an International Organisation such as the United Nations, this applies when an assault on any one of the members means an assault to all its members.


Tomorrow, I'll be discussing just this subject with colleagues at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy. Liberalists on one end of the table and Realists on the other ... another age old debate about unipolarity, the balance of power, the bad boy of the West i.e. Captain America and sorry to bring it up again ... Should the US and it's allies invaded Iraq in 2003? All I ask is a penny for every page that has been written on this and I could retire in sheer luxury for the rest of my life.


Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, is someone I admire. It might sound shallow and wholly unintellectual for me to admit that a good part of the reason for this is that he's virtually my neighbour. Unfortunately it's not what you're thinking ... I don't live in a UN owned mansion on Sutton Place in an exclusive suburb in Manhattan's East Side and fortunately for Kofi, he doesn't live in a 1950's semi-detached home in North West London. We're neighbours because I'm Nigerian and he is Ghanaian, two heavyweight West African countries, only separated only by two little strips of land called Benin and Togo.


Well it only made sense then, I found out what Kofi thought about all of this collective security business, and what better place to look than his famous report in 2004 "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility - Report of the Secretary-Generals's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change". I am about to perform a magic trick so please pay attention. The report is a 99 page report and I am going to sum up what it says about collective security and the use of force in 6 phrases. Legality, Legitimacy, Seriousness of Threat, Proper Purpose, Last resort, Proportional Means and Balance of Consequences. Liberals would probably answer 'No' on all counts and the Realists would say 'Yes'. That's my act done. Good night.

The Power of Words

There are numerous Biblical verses that enunciate how powerful our words are. One that I am particularly drawn to is in the book of Proverbs 18 verse 21 which begins ... "Death and Life are in the power of the tongue ...".

This has been on my mind lately for two reasons. Firstly, Pastor Colin Dye of Kensington Temple in London, where I have worshipped for more than 10 years has been preaching a captivating series on this subject over the last few weeks. The second reason why it has come to the forefront of my mind is because I have just attended a one day conference titled "A Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone" where quite frankly there have been many words.This conference, the 4th in a research series that has been run annually was hosted by the Centre of International Studies and Diplomacy of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) where I'm studying.

When Ambassador Dhanapala, a former Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs of the UN, gave his keynote address, I sat comfortably in my skeptics chair. Settling in, I thought to myself this was going to be another long line of speeches by eminent people (all with CV's as long as my arm) saying what we 'need' to do to rid the world of nuclear weapons. The speeches wouldn't make any difference. However Proverbs 18:21 came back to my memory and Pastor Colin's message about how our words determine who we become made me start to see things in a different light. Is there really anything as 'empty words' if what we say really has that powerful an effect. My mind started to wander back to great Orators, past and present and what they might have achieved with their words ... Winston Churchill, Martin Luther King and of course, my main man, Barack Obama. On the other side of the spectrum I also thought of Adolf Hitler and how he used his communication skills, albeit negatively, to influence the history of the 20th century. It then dawned on me that there are no such things as empty words. There is always an impact, small or big, postive or negative.

I shifted slightly in my skeptics chair, now feeling a little uncomfortable and decided to pay more attention. Ambassador Dhanapala was recollecting his Presidency of the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, a landmark event in disarmament history. 5 of the nuclear states have ratified the treaty. The other 3 nuclear states in our world today, India, Pakistan and Israel are yet to do so. The conference also allowed the extension of the NPT and resolutions on the Middle East were passed. Maybe the thousands of words that will be said today will have an impact somewhere sometime beyond my wildest imagination ... I better pay attention.

Globalisation has created a borderless world? Yeah right! Kid yourself.

It was Mark Twain who said "I didnt have time to write a short letter, so I wrote a long one ...". When you have numerous ideas and extensive information, the challenge is always determining what is pertinent and essential to impart the right message. This is a vital skill.

On Monday, as part of my media training on my course in diplomacy, I am meeting with Simon Cructhley and Deborah Mckenzie, two prominent media consultants in the UK, who have been involved with the BBC at the highest level in Journalism and Political Analysis. I am giving a 3 minute presentation of any subject of my choice in International Relations. 3 minutes! There are subjects I could talk about for 3 days, never mind 3 minutes. Now I understand how Mark Twain must have felt. Especially as the subject I've decided to give my presentation is one on which numerous volumes have been written - Globalisation.

I have just read a few chapters from Thomas Friedmann's "The Lexus and the Olive Tree" where he talks about a new world of globalisation and how we now live in a borderless world. He introduced the concepts of the democratisation of finance, technology and information. In other words these 3 areas are now more readily available to a larger pool of people than ever before. As a management consultant for over 15 years working primary with IT Financial Systems that provide 'better information', I agree with the concepts of this so called 'democratisation' which has exponentially accelerated in the last decade especially since the ready availability of the internet.

Where I begin to be more doubtful is where people begin to talk about a 'borderless' world, where this globalization has broken down the traditional borders and walls seperating countries, people, cultures and religion. Somehow I cannot understand why the young muslim boy, Mohammed, in Indonesia feels the borders which define his culture, religion or sovereignty of where he lives are dissolved just because he has access to the internet. I would even go as far as stating that the discovery of a 'new world' helps to further define your own identity and the borders are even more clearly defined and obvious.

I've got 3 minutes, so I'll look at 3 of the main illustrations put forward by the proponents of the theory that globalisation is creating a borderless world and explain why I think each of these is slightly flawed.

Firstly there is information, knowledge and the good old world wide web. The hyperglobalist is quick to point out the emergence of the new Knowledge economy, a common example being that of the intelligent Indian woman in Mumbai being able to take advantage of her good grasp of English and Accounting making her responsible for the large call centre of a major investment bank in the United States. What they conveniently forget to mention is that she still proudly wears her sari everyday to work, would rather spend the evening at the temple than watching CNN at home and a weekend with the family celebrating a new baby by feasting on vegetarian delicacies still rates much higher than a shopping trip to the glitzy shopping mall in the posh central mumbai district. Borders are defined by these. Sovereignty is defined by this. its not the mere availability of information that creates a borderless world but what people, organisations and governments do with that information.

Secondly there is technology. There are many facets of technology that have promoted globalisation (or should I say capitalism?). I'll focus on just one aspect however. Communication technology primary the rise of email and mobile communications. Ok, I'll admit one thing ... the perception and concept of time and distance has changed with this. Of course twenty years ago when I first started living in London and posted letters to my Dad in Nigeria once a month to tell him how I was, is a far comparison to today where I could text him 3 or 4 times a day to let him know how his grand-daughter's piano concert went. It could make you feel closer and distance is blurred. Importantly though distance and borders are two different things. Because you can get to the border quicker doesn't mean its disappeared. Remember the feeling you get when you get off a long haul flight and have this deep sense of being in a 'different world'. That feeling doesn't go away if you fly by concord. Arguably I might even say it's enhanced.

Larry Summers, a former US deputy treasury secretary always liked to tell the story how in 1988 on the campaign trail for Michael Dukkakis, he was once met by a car at the airport that had a phone in it. He was so thrilled by this that he called his wife to tell her he was in a car with a phone. Incredibly 9 years later, he was visiting Ivory Coast on a US funded health project in a village miles from Abidjan the capital. Having to travel part of the journey by canoe, he didn't even blink when he was handed a cell phone during this river journey to take a call from Washington. Of course, globalisation exclaims at the cell phone but the canoe, the long established river route and the African Chief and villagers decked out in robes that met him on the other side, remind him there are still borders.

Thirdly, there is the democratisation of finance. According to the hyper-globalists, the possibility of financial prosperity is now open to an increasing percentage of the people in the world. Or is it? A Harvard Business School report titled "Saving the Worlds Poor" by C.K. Prahalad shows that 65% of the world population still lives on less than $2000 a year. Maslow's hierarchy of needs has been turned upside down because ironically a good percentage of these own a television and telephone and have access to the internet. Of course in theory, globalisation via the democratisation of information and technology, means these people have the possibility of financial prosperity and they could invest and profit from the stock exchanges in New York, London or Tokyo. How many actually do? I'm not a betting man, but I'll be willing to put a large sum that the percentages are really low. Finance helps people to move between borders more easily. As a young Nigerian man who saved up to come and study in England and subsequently go on to have a successful career, finance was always a key factor.

It's 2009 now, and there is a growing trend of many friends and colleagues of mine, going back from the West to their home countries in Africa, Asia, South America and the Middle East. They are going back to reclaim their own olive tree in their back gardens and leaving their Lexus' in the driveway. The Lexus and the Olive Tree was Thomas Friedmann's analogy of the irony of globalisation. He recalls a journey on a bullet train in Japan following a visit to a high technology Toyota plant where the Lexus car was made. He had been completely blown away by the incredible robotic technology that created the automobile, but even on his journey back, he was sat in this train reading an article in the International Herald Tribune on an aspect of the Arab/Israeli conflict basically an argument in one of the oldest corners of the world, a fight, in his analogy, about who owned which olive tree.

The truth is you and your neighbour may both have a Lexus' in your driveways, but who owns which olive tree in your back gardens is still as relevant as ever if not more so. Globalisation hasn't created a borderless world so don't kid yourself.